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Abstract
This paper briefly summarizes the history and growth of
franchising in the United States, and then describes many
aspects of the franchising relationship, including how
financial terms in franchise contracts have changed over
the last quarter century. It also summarizes some other
changes that have occurred in franchise contracts as this
mode of organization has become more mature. In
particular, some sources of franchisor-franchisee conflict
have arisen or become more pronounced over time, and
contracting practices have evolved to remove, or at least
reduce, such conflict. Also, the legal status of some
contract clauses has been clarified or challenged by new
statutes and court decisions, leading to additional changes
in franchise contracts and their terms.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language,' the word "franchise" comes from the old French wordfranche,
which means "free or exempt." In medieval times, a franchise was a right or
privilege granted by a sovereign power: king, church, or local government.
2
Sovereigns granted franchises for the right to maintain civil order, collect
taxes, and promote various activities such as building roads, holding fairs,
t This paper relies heavily on various portions of our book, ROGER D. BLAIR &
FRANCINE LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING (2005), especially Chapters 1
to 3. In many cases the data presented herein, however, have been updated. We thank
Robert Picard for his expert assistance with the large data set we rely on, and the
University of Florida, the Ross School of Business, University of Michigan as well as
CIBE, University of Michigan, for their support.
* Ross School and Business, University of Michigan
** Huber Hurst Professor, Department of Economics, University of Florida
'AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, available at
http://www.bartleby.com/61/48/F0294800.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
2 BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note t, at 3.
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and organizing markets."3 In essence, the sovereign gave an individual or
group the monopoly rights over a particular activity in a particular location
for a particular period of time. In most cases, a grantee was required to
make a payment to the sovereign power in exchange for this right or
privilege, usually in the form of a share of the product or profit.4 That
payment was called a royalty, a term still used today.
Today, a franchise agreement is most often understood to be a
contractual arrangement between two legally independent firms in which
one firm, the franchisee, pays the other firm, the franchisor, for the right to
sell the franchisor's product, the right to use its trademarks and business
format in a certain location for a certain period of time, or both.5 According
to Dicke, the use of the word "franchise" to describe a method of doing
business or distributing goods and services entered the English business
lexicon in 1959.6 In fact, governments still grant franchises today in certain
industries. This occurs, for example, in the cable television industry in the
United States where the rights to be the sole provider of cable services in a
given market for a certain time period are sold by local governments to
firms usually through what is called a "franchise bidding" process.7 In
addition, the word "franchise" is used in the sports industry to refer to the
right granted by a professional league to operate a team in a particular
locale. 8 Most often, however, the term franchise now refers to a business
relationship between legally independent commercial firms.
9
According to the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), the body that
has jurisdiction in the United States over federal disclosure rules for
franchisors, three elements must be present for a business relationship to be
deemed a franchise.' 0 First, the franchisor must license a trade name and
3Id.
4Id.
'Id. at 3-4.
6 THOMAS S. DICKE, FRANCHISING IN AMERICA: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BUSINESS
METHOD, 1840-1980,2 (1992).
7 See, e.g., Mark A. Zupan, Cable Franchise Renewals: Do Incumbent Firms Behave
Opportunistically?, 20 RAND J. ECON. 473 (1989); Robin A. Praeger, Firm Behavior
in Franchise Monopoly Markets, 21 RAND J. ECON. 211 (1990) (discussing "franchise
bidding" in the U.S. cable industry); Eduardo M.R.A. Engel, Ronald D. Fischer &
Alexander Galetovic, Least-Present- Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway
Franchising, 109 J. POL. ECON. 993 (2001) (analyzing contemporary highway
construction franchise contracts granted by a government).
8 See, e.g., ROGER G. NOLL & ANDREW ZIMBALIST, SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES: THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS (1997) and Football History,
available at http://www.football.com/history/index.shtml.
9 See John Stanworth & James Curran, Colas, Burgers, Shakes and Shirkers: Towards a
Sociological Model of Franchising in the Market Economy, 14 J. Bus. VENTURING 323
(1999) (providing a detailed account of different definitions of commercial franchises
used in the academic literature across a variety of fields).
1o See, e.g., Thomas M. Pitegoff, Franchise Relationship Laws: A Minefield for
Franchisors, 45 BUS. LAW. 289, 292 (1989) (reviewing the legal elements of franchises
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trademark that the franchisee operates under, or the franchisee must sell
products or services identified by this trademark.11 Second, the franchisor
must exert significant control over the operation of the franchisee or
provide significant assistance to the franchisee. 12  Third, the franchisee
must pay at least $500 to the franchisor at any time before or within the first
six months of operation. 13 Note that though this definition of franchising is
specific to the United States, most definitions used by foreign authorities,
including Australia, Canada, and the European Union, rely on similar sets
of criteria. 14 In their implementation, however, foreign definitions are often
less inclusive than in the United States.1
5
The remainder of this article briefly summarizes the history and
growth of franchising in the United States, in Sections II to IV. This is
followed, in Section V, by a description of several aspects of the
franchising relationship, and how contracting practices have changed as this
mode of organization has become more mature. In particular, sources of
franchisor-franchisee conflict have arisen or become more pronounced over
time, and the legal status of some contract clauses has been clarified or
challenged by new statutes and court decisions. This, in turn, resulted in
some of the changes discussed in Section V. Finally, Section VI contains a
summary and some concluding remarks.
II. TRADITIONAL AND BUSINESS-FORMAT FRANCHISING - A BRIEF
HISTORY
In its surveys of franchising, the Department of Commerce ("USDOC")
historically has distinguished two types of franchised relationships:
as per the text of various state franchise laws). See also Stanworth & Curran, supra note
9, at 324-25.
' Pitegoff, supra note 10, at 292.
:2 Id.
13 Id.; see also Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and
Business Opportunity Ventures, 16 C.F.R. § 436 (1979), (amended in 2007); Final
Interpretive Guides, 44 Fed. Reg. 49967 (1979) (explaining that payments for inventory
at bona fide wholesale prices for resale are not considered a minimum payment for the
purposes of this last requirement).
14 See, e.g., Franchising Code of Conduct, Commonwealth of Australia, 1998; see also
Arthur Wishart Act, (Franchise Disclosure), S.O. 2000, c. 3, available at www.e-
laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes (last visited Mar. 14, 2009); EEC Block Exemption for
Vertical Restraints, Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999
on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and
concerted practices. Note that a definition of franchising is no longer included directly
in the EEC Block Exemption for Vertical Restraints but a description of the contents of
franchise agreements is found in the attached guidelines (text figure 35, 36, 189 ff.) and
the know-how definition has remained the same as in the old EEC Block Exemption for
Franchise Agreements.
15 BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note t, at 5.
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traditional (or product and trade name) and business-format franchising.' 6
The former is characterized by franchised dealers who "concentrate on one
company's product line and to some extent identify their business with that
company." 17 A s the term suggests, traditional franchising is the oldest form
of franchising. By most accounts, it can be traced to the mid-1800s when
the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company and the Singer Sewing
Machines Company sold their products through sales agents who were
given exclusive sales territories.18 Initially these firms, like others who
used such agents at the time, imposed few restrictions or qualifications on
their agents and exerted very little control over them. Over time, however,
both companies found they needed more control over these sales agents if
they were to protect their respective reputations and brands.' 9  The
McCormick Harvesting Machine Company responded by establishing
company-owned branch houses throughout the United States and Canada. z°
These branch houses were given oversight responsibilities for the sales
agents in each branch's territory. As a result, the McCormick Company
was able to systematize procedures and communications with its agents,
thereby transforming them into what are now called "dealers." The Singer
Company addressed the need for control by converting many of the
independent agencies into company outlets.2 ' More importantly, it devised
a series of recommendations for the remaining agents about how the offices
should be run and, for the first time, required detailed financial reporting
from these agents. The contracts and methods of control that Singer
developed are largely recognized as the forerunners of the modem franchise
agreement.22
6 ANDREW KOSTECKA, UNITED STATE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, FRANCHISING IN
THE ECONOMY: 1986-1988 1 (1988).
17 id.
18 See DICKE, supra note 6 (discussing the history of franchising in the United States,
including a detailed account of its evolution at these two companies); see also Thomas
G. Marx, The Development of the Franchise Distribution System in the U.S. Automobile
Industry, 59 Bus. HIST. REV. 465 (1985) (discussing the development of franchising in
automobile retailing in the U.S.).19 See DICKE, supra note 6; BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note t, at 5.
20 id.
21 id
22 BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note t, at 6. In England, the development of franchising
is usually traced to the development of the "tied house system," namely the ownership
of licensed beer retailers by brewers. See D.M. Knox, The Development of the Tied
House System in London, 10 OXFOR.D ECON. PAPERS 66 (1958) (discussing the reasons
behind the growth of this system in London). However, in a private conversation with
Martin Mendelsohn, he pointed out that it is not clear that tied houses can be classified
as a form of franchise since the pubs typically do not operate under a common trade
name.
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Traditional franchising in the United States is comprised largely of
automobile dealerships, gasoline service stations, and soft-drink bottlers.
In these businesses, the franchisor is a manufacturer who sells finished or
semi-finished products to its franchisees. In turn, the franchisees resell
these products to consumers or other firms in the distribution chain. Profits
for the franchisor/manufacturers in these relationships flow from the
markups franchisors earn as part of the wholesale price they charge their
dealers for the products. In contrast to business-format franchising, as
described below, traditional franchisees do not pay running royalties on
their sales.
Though traditional franchising accounted for 72.7% of all sales by
franchised chains in 1986, it comprised only one-third of the establishments
and one-fourth of the employment in franchised chains during the last year
in which the United States government collected and published various
statistics on franchising.24 The remaining 27.3% of sales were generated by
business-format franchising firms, where the franchisor primarily sells a
way of doing business (or a business format) to its franchisees. More
specifically, as described by the USDOC, a business-format franchise
contract usually "includes not only the product, service, and trademark, but
the entire business format itself-a marketing strategy and plan, operating
manuals and standards, quality control, and continuing two-way
communication.
25
The first true business-format franchise system was created by
Martha Matilda Harper.26  This entrepreneur developed her network of
Harper Beauty Shops in the early 1890s using a business model that
included all the components of a business format as described by the
USDOC.2 7 But despite growing her network to more than 500 shops in the
U.S., Canada, and Europe by the mid-1920s, Matilda Harper unfortunately
23 See ROBERT T. JUSTIS & RICHARD J. JUDD, FRANCHISING 1-9 (1998). William E.
Metzger is said to have been the first franchisee in automotive retailing; he obtained a
franchise to sell steam automobiles from General Motors Corporation in 1898. Coca-
Cola sold its first bottling franchise in 1899 according to Coca-Cola Enterprises,
available at http://www.cokecce.com/pages/allContent.asp?pageid=88 (last visited
Mar. 14, 2009).
24 BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note t, at 6; see also, infra Table I and Section III. The
USDOC cancelled the publication of its yearly reports on the state of franchising in the
economy (produced by Andrew Kostecka, and entitled Franchising in the Economy) in
1988 as part of its privatization program. This publication was the only source of
census-type data on franchising in the United States. Efforts by the International
Franchise Association ("IFA") to take over the publication of this annual report on a
permanent basis were unsuccessful. In cooperation with FRANdata Corp. and then with
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, however, the IFA Educational Foundation has produced
several reports whose data we refer to throughout this paper.
25 KOSTECKA, supra note 16, at 3.
26 JANE R. PLITT, MARTHA MATILDA HARPER AND THE AMERICAN DREAM (2000).
27 KOSTECKA, supra note 16, at 3.
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did not leave a lasting mark on franchising.28 Other firms, such as the
supermarket chain Piggly Wiggly, Hertz Car Rentals, A&W Restaurants,
Maid Rite (a hamburger restaurant chain), and Terminix Termite and Pest
Control all started franchising in the 1920s and are still involved in
franchising today.29 These early entrants were followed in the 1930s by
companies in the United States like Howard Johnson Restaurants, Stewart's
Drive-In, Arthur Murray Schools of Dancing, and Culligan, and by the
Canadian Tire retail chain and its Associate Store program, Merle Norman
Cosmetics, and Le Groupe RONA among others in Canada.30 But it was
not until the1950s, with the advent of chains such as Burger King and
McDonald's, and the economic boom of the post-war era that business-
format franchising fully came into its own in the United States and
Canada. 31 By the mid-1990s, it had also expanded throughout much of the
rest of the world.32
Business-format franchising today encompasses a large number of
industries: automotive products and services, computer sales, business aids
and services, construction and maintenance, legal, domestic, and child-care
services, and non-food retailing as well as the more visible hotel, fast-food,
and car rental franchises. In exchange for the business format, franchisees
typically pay a relatively small lump-sum fee at the beginning of the
contract period and continuing royalties that are a fixed percentage of the
franchisee's sales revenues.33 Business-format franchisees often contribute
28 BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note t, at 7.
29 Cf FEDERATION FRANCAISE DE LA FRANCHISE, TOUTE LA FRANCHISE: LES TEXTES,
LES CHIFFRES, LES RIESEAUX (2003) (explaining that Jean Prouvost, owner of the
Laini~re de Roubais, launched his network of Pingouin stores also in the 1920s, thereby
initiating the concept of franchised distribution in France). Though this source indicates
that the network of stores was developed in the 1930s, the French National Archives
states that it was started in 1923, available at
http://www.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr/camt/fr/egf/lettrel.html (last visited Mar.
14, 2009).
30 Some networks, such as IGA, le Groupe RONA, and Best Western International, are
organized as cooperatives whose role is to provide their franchisees/members with
purchasing power and name recognition. The development and organization of these
cooperatives is interesting in light of Richard E. Caves and William F. Murphy's view
of franchising as a mechanism by which "franchisees hire out the collective and large-
scale production of goodwill." Richard E. Caves & William F. Murphy, Franchising:
Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets, 109 S. ECON. J. 572, 575 (1976). See also
Francine Lafontaine & Emmanuel Raynaud, Residual Claims and Self Enforcement as
Incentive Mechanisms in Franchise Contracts: Substitute or Complement, in THE
ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS: THEORIES AND APPLICATIONS 315-36 (Eric Brousseau &
Jean-Michel Glachant eds., 2002) (drawing an analogy between food production
cooperatives and franchises).
31 DICKE, supra note 6, at 1.
32 For an overview of the number of franchisors and franchisees in thirty-six countries
around the world, see ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO., WORLDWIDE FRANCHISING
STATISTICS: A STUDY OF WORLDWIDE FRANCHISE ASSOCIATIONS (1995).
33 BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note t, at 7.
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an additional fraction of their sales or revenues toward an advertising fund
for the chain as a whole.34
In the end, the distinction between traditional and business-format
franchising is somewhat arbitrary and a matter of degree. Dnes and Klein,
for example, both argue that there is little economic difference between the
two, in terms of the type of agreements they rely on and the type of support
provided or control exerted by franchisors.35 In regard to theoretical
analyses of franchise relationships, the distinction between these two types
of franchising indeed is largely irrelevant; researchers have considered both
types simultaneously in many studies.3 6 However, the distinction is
important from a descriptive standpoint for two main reasons. First, in
many countries outside the United States, traditional franchising is not
included in franchising statistics. As a result, the franchising sector appears
large in the United States relative to those countries. Second, in the United
States, authors often refer to all franchising when they emphasize its
economic importance, but only to business-format franchising when
describing its growth. This is because business-format franchising has
grown much more than traditional franchising in the last few decades. The
issue of growth in franchising is discussed further in Section IV.
III. FRANCHISING BY INDUSTRY
According to the USDOC, "[r]etailing dominates franchising,
accounting for 87% of all franchising receipts in 1987. The retail sales of
all firms associated with franchising reached about $522 billion in 1987, or
34% of all U.S. retail sales." 37 Table 1, infra, shows the sectoral
breakdown for sales, the number of establishments, and employment for
franchised firms in the United States in 1986 according to the USDOC.38 It
also shows average sales per establishment in each sector.
The data in Table 1 confirm that sales through traditional
franchising in 1986 were almost three times the level of sales of business-
format franchisors. Contrary to what occurs with sales, however, the
majority of establishments and jobs were found in business-format
franchising. Specifically, as seen in Table 1, the number of establishments
was twice as large, and the number of employees was almost three times as
large, in business-format as compared to traditional franchising. Thus, as
seen in the last column of Table 1, sales per unit and sales per employee
were much larger in traditional than in business-format franchising.
34 Id.
35 See generally ANTONY W. DNES, FRANCHISING: A CASE-STUDY APPROACH, (1992);
Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 2 J. CORP. FIN. 9 (1995).
36 See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of 'Unfair' Contractual
Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 356 (1980) and Klein, supra note 35.
37 KOSTECKA, supra note 16, at 14.
38 d. at 40, 44.
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While we no longer have government data on franchising, the
International Franchise Association ("IFA") and Price Waterhouse Coopers
have published new reports on the economic impact of franchising in the
U.S. economy in both the years of 2004 and 2008. 39  The first report
contained data relative to 2001, and the second provided the same
information for 2005.40 According to the first report, in 2001, business-
format franchising encompassed 4.3 times as many establishments and
employed four times as many workers as traditional franchising did.
According to the second report, by 2005, there were 5.7 times more
establishments and 4.5 times more jobs in business-format franchising than
in traditional franchising.4'
39 IFA Educational Foundation and Price Waterhouse Coopers, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
FRANCHISED BUSINESSES, PART 1 (2004) [hereinafter ECONOMIC IMPACT PART I]; and
IFA Educational Foundation and Price Waterhouse Coopers, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
FRANCHISED BUSINESSES, PART 11 (2008) [hereinafter ECONOMIC IMPACT PART II]. Note
that although there are some issues with the data and methodology used to estimate the
extent and growth of franchising in this and a later report produced by the same authors,
these reports still represent an important effort and source of information on
franchising. We therefore benchmark their estimates with some other potential
measures.
4 See ECONOMIC IMPACT PART 1, supra note 39; ECONOMIC IMPACT PART 11, supra note
39.
41 See ECONOMIC IMPACT PART 11, supra note 39.
The Evolution of Franchising
TABLE 1: SALES, ESTABLISHMENTS AND EMPLOYMENT IN
FRANCHIS[NG IN THE UNITED STATES [N 1986
Sector Total Sales Total Number of Sales per
($000) Establishment Employees Establishmen
s* t ($000)
Automobile 307,256,00 27,600 947,400 11,132
and Truck 0
Dealers
Gasoline 86,618,000 120,510 596,400 719
Service
Stations
Soft-Drink 19,662,000 1,203 126,200 16,344
Bottlers
Total: 413,536,00 149,313 1,670,000 2,770
Traditional 0
Franchising
Automotive 11,300,863 36,763 186,182 307
Products &
Serv. (1)
Business
Aids &
Services (2)
Construction,
Home
Improvement
Maintenance
& Cleaning
Serv. (3)
Convenience
Stores
Educational
Products &
Serv. (4)
Hotels,
Motels and
Campground
s
Laundry &
Dry cleaning
Services
Recreation,
Entertainmen
t & Travel (5)
Rental
13,288,254
4,615,360
11,278,895
935,166
15,983,990
291,802
3,549,025
52,718
18,900
15,524
8,625
8,203
2,297
7,901
669,522
118,991
152,688
41,210
555,674
9,891
27,732
726
108
1,949
127
449
6,155,006 9,528
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Services
(Auto-Truck)
(6)
Rental
Services
(Equipment)
(7)
Restaurants
Retailing
(Food Non-
Convenience)
(9)
Retailing
(Non-Food)
(8)
Miscellaneou
s (10)
716,019
52,273,863
10,746,011
23,102,779
1,305,715
2,718
78,203
19,852
45,456
6,122
[Vol. 3:2
14,926
2,453,621
214,768
274,663
44,486
Total 155,542,74 312,810 4,830,777 497
Business 8
Format
Franchising
Total 569,078,74 462,123 6,500,777 1,231
Franchising 8
Note: includes part-time and working proprietors.
(1) Includes Tire, Battery and Accessory Stores; Auto and Truck Wash
Services, and Brake and Muffler Repair and Services and some
establishments with significant sales of non-automotive products such as
Household Appliances, Garden Supplies, etc.
(2) Includes Computer Services, Business Consultants and Brokers,
Security, Dentists, Insurance, and Others.
(3) Includes Furniture Repairs, Water Conditioning, Lawn Care, Sewer
Cleaning and Carpet Cleaning.
(4) Includes Day-Care Centers and Health and Diet Services.
(5) Includes Travel Agencies, Miniature Golf Courses, and Dance Studios.
(6) Includes Leasing.
(7) Includes Formal Wear.
(8) Includes General Merchandise, Drugs and Cosmetics, Gift Shops, Shoes
and Apparel, Hardware, Paints and Floor Covering, Furniture, Draperies
and Bedding, Consumer Electronics, and Vending.
(9) Includes Retail Specialty Food Shops, Donut Shops, Ice Cream Stores,
Coffee Services, Candy Stores, Bakeries and Supermarkets.
(10) Includes Beauty Salons, Fitness Centers, Wholesale Services and
Others.
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The data in Table 1, supra, also indicates that franchising occurs in
a wide variety of retail and service industries in the U.S. economy. Within
business-format franchising, most of the sales, units, and employees in
1986 were found in the restaurant sector, which includes well-known chains
such as Burger King, KFC, Little Caesar's, McDonald's, Subway, and
many others.42 According to the IFA and Price Waterhouse Coopers 2008
report, this is still true today, with 35% of all jobs in business format
franchises occurring in the quick-service restaurant sector and another 12%
in the full-service restaurant sector.4 3 Using employment as the 2008 IFA
and Price Waterhouse Coopers report does, to gage the size of different
sectors, the government data (from USDOC) suggests that in 1986, the
sector where the second largest amount of franchised business activity took
place was the business aids and services sector.4  This sector includes
firms such as Money Mailer, SignFast, and Snelling Personnel Services.
The information in the IFA and Price Waterhouse Coopers 2008 report
confirms that this is also still true today.4 5
IV. MEASURING GROWTH IN FRANCHISING IN THE U.S.
We begin by measuring growth over the period from 1972 until
1986 when the availability of census-type data on the number of
franchisors, the number of units, and sales by franchised chains from the
USDOC makes this straightforward.46 Figures 1 and 2, infra, show the data
on franchising growth relative to GDP growth in two different ways. First,
Figure 1 presents information on the evolution of the number of units of
business-format and traditional franchised chains, along with data on the
evolution of Real GDP, from 1972 to 1986. We use "number of units"
instead of "sales" as an alternative way to capture real rather than nominal
growth in franchising. Second, Figure 2 jointly addresses the issue of
same-unit growth along with growth in number of units by depicting the
value of goods sold through franchising as a proportion of Real GDP
between 1972 and 1986. Such a ratio gives a "unit free" measure of the
extent of franchising, eliminating the need to distinguish between nominal
and real figures.47
Figure 1 first shows the dramatic decrease in the number of units in
traditional franchising over this period. This decrease is mostly due to the
closing of a large number of smaller gasoline stations that were replaced, as
part of the industry's rationalization, by new "pumper" stations that could
42 See Table 1, supra.
43 See ECONOMIC IMPACT PART II, supra note 39.
- KOSTECKA, supra note 16, at 40.
45 See ECONOMIC IMPACT PART II, supra note 39.
46 See Figure 1, infra.
47 For meaningful comparisons, both franchising sales and GDP need to be measured in
the same units, either both in real dollars or both in nominal dollars.
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handle much larger volumes.48 Figure 1 also shows that the number of
units in business-format franchising has grown steadily over this period, as
did GDP. As the time trends in the business-format franchising and GDP
series are quite similar, it appears that in terms of units, business-format
franchising was growing at a rate similar to that of the economy as a whole
throughout the period covered by the data.
FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF UNITS AND REAL GDP IN THE U.S.
45U,00U
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As discussed supra, Figure 1 focuses solely on the number of
establishments in franchised chains. The number of establishments in
franchised chains is important given that much of the growth in franchising,
especially in business-format franchising, is achieved through growth in
number of units. 49 Nevertheless, sales revenues in franchising can increase
independently from higher numbers of units if per unit sales volumes are
increasing in real terms. This phenomenon explains what happened for
48 Andrew Kleit, THE ECONOMICS OF GASOLINE RETAILING: PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTION
AND RETAILING ISSUES IN THE U.S. 14 (2003).
49 See Figure 1, supra.
1973 1975
Traditional - units
-- ,-- Bus.Format - units
-e, -- GOP 1 98?-84
D71 1987
The Evolution of Franchising
traditional franchising, where total sales increased in real terms throughout
the period despite the decrease in number of units.
Figure 2 captures both the growth in the number of units and in
sales per unit relative to GDP growth by showing the ratio of franchising
sales to GDP. This chart also shows that the value of goods sold through
traditional franchising outlets has remained fairly stable overall as a percent
of GDP between 1972 and 1986. On the other hand, the value of goods
sold via outlets of business-format franchisors has increased from 2.3% to
3.5% of total GDP. When sales through both traditional and business-
format franchising are considered together, the value of goods sold through
outlets of franchised firms increased from 11.6% to 12.8% of total GDP
between 1972 to 1986.50 Simple extrapolation from this trend suggests that
franchising would represent about 14% of nominal GDP in 2001, and
14.4% of nominal GDP in 2005, which would amount to $1.79 trillion."
50 See Figure 2, supra.
51 Note that nominal GDP in 2001 in the U.S. was $10.08 trillion. Under the assumption
that franchise retail sales have remained at 34% of all retailing, as they were in 1986,
and with retail sales in 2001 at close to $3.4 trillion, franchise retail sales would amount
to about $1.16 trillion. KOSTECKA, supra, note 16, at 14; US Census Bureau, Monthly
Retail Trade Survey, Historical Retail Trade Data. Assuming retailing still constitutes
about 87% of franchising sales, as it did in 1986, total franchising would amount to
$1.33 trillion, just between the $1.42 trillion one obtains from simple extrapolation
above and the IFA-Price Waterhouse Coopers estimate of $1.28 trillion. KosTEcKA,
supra, note 16, at 14. On the other hand, taking the $1.42 trillion at face value and
retaining the ratio of retailing/franchising at 87%, one would infer that franchise sales
accounted for 36% rather than 34% of all retail sales in 2001.
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FIGURE 2: FRANCHISING SALES AS A PERCENT OF GDP, 1972-1986
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These estimates are interestingly quite consistent with those
obtained by the IFA and Price Waterhouse Coopers in their 2004 and 2008
reports respectively.52 Specifically, their 2004 report puts the total output
of franchised businesses, defined as the difference between sales revenue
and cost of goods sold, at $642 billion in 2001. Assuming the cost of
goods sold represents about 50% of sales in most of the relevant
industries, 54 total sales would be about $1.28 trillion in 2001. This estimate
is somewhat lower than, but still not dramatically different from, the 14%
of nominal GDP estimate mentioned above (given that 14% of nominal
GDP would amount to total sales of $14.2 trillion). In their second report,
52 See ECONOMIC IMPACT PART I, supra note 39; ECONOMIC IMPACT PART II, supra note
39.
53 KOSTECKA, supra note 16, at 4.
54 As the cost of cars and the cost of gasoline are clearly much more than 50% of the
sales revenues of car dealers and gasoline stations, this assumption is clearly incorrect
in traditional franchising. On the other hand, in more service oriented sectors such as
hotels or fast-food, the cost of goods sold is much lower than 50%. We use 50% as a
rough measure of cost of goods sold across all these sectors.
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the total output of franchised chains in 2005 is estimated at $880.9 billion.55
Assuming again that the cost of goods sold is roughly equal to one-half of
sales revenues in the types of businesses that are franchised, this would
imply total sales of $1.76 trillion in 2005 are very close to the results of our
extrapolation above.
We conclude that the growth in franchising as a whole has been
consistent generally with that of the U.S. economy. In fact, the estimates
above suggest that franchising has grown somewhat faster than the overall
economy. These estimates indicate that sales through franchised
companies, including car dealerships and gasoline stations, could now
represent about 14 to 14.5% of GDP, whereas according to the USDOC,
they stood at 12.8% of GDP in the mid-1980s. 56
V. FRANCHISE CONTRACT TERMS AND THEIR EVOLUTION
Franchise contracts stipulate the conditions under which a
franchised outlet is to be operated, including the rights and obligations of
both parties under the agreement. In this section, we describe the financial
terms-franchise fees, royalty rates, ongoing fixed payments, and
advertising fees-used in business-format franchising contracts.57 We then
provide some data on the common non-financial terms of these contracts.
We emphasize throughout that, although there are some common elements
and common trends in franchise contracting, there is also great variance in
the way that different franchisors organize their relationships with their
franchisees. This tendency to organize various aspects of their relationship
differently is not surprising when one considers the variety of business
activities that franchisors are engaged in. It is important to recognize this
variety, especially when it comes to evaluating the potential effect of
various forms of regulatory intervention.
Economic theory suggests that franchisors should tailor their
franchise contract terms for each unit and franchisee in a chain. 8 In
practice, however, contracts are remarkably uniform across franchisees at a
point in time within chains. Thus, they are insensitive to variations
involving individual, outlet, and specific market conditions. Indeed, a
business-format franchisor most often uses a single business-format
franchising contract-a single royalty rate and franchise fee combination-
for all of its franchised operations that join the chain at a given point in
55 See ECONOMIC IMPACT PART II, supra note 39.
56 KOSTECKA, supra note 16; Tables 5 to 9.
57 In traditional franchising, the franchisor earns its profit via mark ups when it sells the
product to the franchisee. There are no publicly available data on such mark-ups.
58 Specifically, for the franchisor to extract the maximum profit from each location, the
contract would have to take local market conditions into account. This would
necessarily require location-specific contract terms.
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time. 59 For example, in a survey of 130 business-format franchised chains,
Lafontaine found that 42% of her respondents offered their contracts on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis while 38% allowed for some negotiations, but only
for the non-monetary terms.60 Thus, uniformity, especially for monetary
terms, is the norm.
Within the United States, the Robinson-Patman Act encourages
upstream firms to set uniform wholesale prices.61  This law, however,
cannot explain contract uniformity in business-format franchising because
the act applies only to the sale of commodities for resale and excludes
franchising rights.62 Various state-level disclosure rules also may increase
the cost of using different contract terms with franchisees. For example, the
rules may require franchisors to file new or amended versions of their
disclosure documents when the franchisor modifies the terms of its contract
for an individual franchisee.63 Nevertheless, these constraints do not appear
to be the main reason for the degree of uniformity in financial contract
terms that is observed in practice.
Several other factors, however, may help explain the uniformity of
financial terms in franchise contracts. First, disclosure requirements do not
increase the cost of specifying fees using formulas such as making the
franchise fee or royalty rate a function of local population levels, specifying
minimum and maximum levels of fees, and so on. In fact, as we describe
below, franchisors do use formulaic fees, but only to a limited extent.
Second, and most interestingly, franchisors themselves point to other
factors as the main justifications for contract term uniformity. When asked
why they use a uniform contract, only 22% of the 130 business-format
franchisors in Lafontaine's survey indicated that legal considerations were a
factor. They chose this answer this infrequently despite being allowed to
select as many factors as they wished from a list of factors given to them.
On the contrary, 73% of them indicated that contract uniformity is simply
desirable because of resulting consistency and fairness toward franchisees.64
Another 27% of the respondents cited transaction costs as a main factor
59 Francine Lafontaine, Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results. 23
RAND J. ECON. 263, 264 (1992).60 Francine Lafontaine, How and Why Do Franchisors Do What They Do: A Survey
Report, in FRANCHISING: PASSPORT FOR GROWTH & WORLD OF OPPORTUNITY (Patrick
J. Kaufmann ed.), Sixth Annual Proceedings of the Society of Franchising, (1992).
6' Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 13, (West, 2008) (forbiding price
discrimination in the sale of commodities by manufacturers or distributors towards
resellers where the effect is to reduce competition or tend to create a monopoly). See
ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 290-311 (2008).
62 JUSTIS & JUDD, supra note 23, at 151.
63 See, e.g., MARTIN D. FERN ET AL., FRANCHISING LAW: PRACTICE AND FORMS, THE
FRANCHISOR (1996).
64 See Lafontaine, supra note 60, at 18.
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driving uniformity, stating that such uniformity makes it easier to
administer and enforce the contract.
65
The chain's inability to deal with special circumstances, and the
resulting lost franchise sales, was the main disadvantage of uniform
financial contract terms cited by franchisors. The existence of this
drawback was mentioned, however, by only about one-half of the
franchisors. 6 The other half either stated that they saw no disadvantage in
the use of uniform contracts or did not identify any particular disadvantage
when asked to do so.
67
The uniformity of the contract terms offered by a franchisor at a given
point in time, on the other hand, allows us to now examine the detail of
those contracts. In the remainder of this section, we describe the use and
level of different contract terms using data collected from franchisor
directories and listings. The database covers all franchisors that appear at
least once in the 1981 to 1993 Entrepreneur Magazine's "Franchise 500"
surveys or in the 1994 to 2007 editions of the Source Book of Franchise
Opportunities, now called Bond's Franchise Guide.68 Each year, these
publications give detailed profiles for about 1,000 franchising companies.
Hence they cover a very significant portion of the industry. Note that the
data for a given year are obtained from the next year's survey or directory
because this information is published early in the calendar year. In other
words, the 2006 data are from the 2007 Bond's Franchise Guide. After
1994, we rely on Bond's Franchise Guide because Entrepreneur Magazine's
1994 survey covered fewer chains than usual, and from 1995 onward,
Entrepreneur Magazine stopped reporting advertising fee data.
Furthermore, the Bond's Franchise Guide, which has the advantage of
providing more details on each of the franchisors it profiles, had become an
annual publication by then. Together, these sources provide information
65 Id.; see also R. Preston McAfee & Marius Schwartz, Opportunism in Multilateral
Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity, 84 AM. ECON.
REV., 210, 223-25 (1994) (giving an opportunism-based explanation for contract
uniformity); Sugato Bhattacharyya & Francine Lafontaine, Double-Sided Moral Hazard
and the Nature of Share Contracts, 26 RAND J. ECON., 761-781 (1995) (suggesting
that the benefit from contract customization may not be large enough to warrant even
low customization costs).
66 See Lafontaine, supra note 60, at 18.
67 Id. Note that while franchise contract terms offered to potential franchisees at a point
in time tend to be uniform, in the course of the franchise relationship, a franchisor may
adjust the terms of the contract temporarily to give struggling franchisees a chance to
survive. In other words, given that franchisee failure is damaging for the system,
franchisors sometimes grant rent relief or reduce required royalties for struggling but
otherwise promising franchisees in spite of specific contract terms. See, e.g., DNES,
supra note 35.
68 We exclude from the data the few chains that are in these sources but report either no
outlet at all (that is, no company nor franchised outlet) or report no fees (that is, no
royalty rate, franchise fee, advertising rate or ongoing fixed payments) in the survey
year.
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from 1980 through 2006 (except for 1999 and 2002 as the 2000 and 2003
Bond's Franchise Guide were never published) and cover a total amount of
approximately 5500 franchisors, including approximately 12% Canadian
franchisors.69
A. Financial Terms
1. Franchise Fees
The vast majority of franchisors require that their franchisees pay
an initial lump-sum fee called a franchise fee. 70 This fee is paid only once
at the beginning of the contract period. Of the various financial contract
terms, this one varies the most across franchisees in a given chain. In the
fifty-four disclosure documents franchisees have access to, Bhattacharyya
and Lafontaine find that this variation arises for three main reasons.7 1 First,
some franchisors set this fee in a formulaic way, most often based on the
size of the territory that a franchisee is awarded or on its market potential.
Second, some franchisors require different fees for different types of
franchised units, i.e., different franchise options such as a free-standing fast
food operation versus a food court version of the same business.7 2 Third,
franchisors may require different fees for additional units sold to existing
franchisees or for area developers, or set their fee differently for a
"conversion" franchise-that is when an existing business joins a chain.73
Figure 3 displays the distribution of (the average) franchise fees
charged by 968 franchisors for which we have such data in 2006, expressed
in constant 2001 U.S. dollars.74  It shows that the vast majority of
franchisors charge an initial franchise fee between $5,000 and $35,000, and
most commonly between $15,000 and $30,000. The median fee is between
$20,000 and $25,000. Very few franchisors, only seven out of 968, charge
no such fee. At the other extreme, only seventeen of them request a
franchise fee above $80,000. Overall, franchise fees are quite small relative
to the total payments made by franchisees to franchisors. Over the life of
69 Franchise 500, ENTREPRENEUR MAGAZINE, various years; ROBERT E. BOND, SOURCE
BOOK OF FRANCHISE OPPORTUNITIES, various years; and ROBERT E. BOND, BOND's
FRANCHISE GUIDE, various years.
70 See Table 3, infta.
7' Bhattacharyya & Lafontaine, supra note 65.
72 id.
73 id.
74 When only a lower bound was given, as in "$30,000 and up," we use twice the lower
bound as an estimate for the upper bound, and then calculate the mean between these
two values. This amounts to using 1.5 times the lower bound as our measure of average
franchise fee. When only an upper bound is given, as in "up to $40,000," we use half
the upper bound as an estimate for the lower bound, and again calculate the mean. This
amounts to using 0.75 times the upper bound as our estimate of the mean franchise fee.
Additionally, we use the end of 2001 exchange rate for Canadian dollars to transform
the franchise fees of Canadian franchisors into U.S. dollars.
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these contracts, franchise fees usually represent only 5 to 10% of the
revenues that a franchisor receives from a franchised unit, with the
remainder coming from sales-based royalties or advertising fees. For
example, suppose a firm charged very typical fees, such as a franchise fee
of $20,000 and a royalty rate of 5%. Then assuming relatively low sales
revenues of $500,000 per year in real terms over a fifteen year contract (the
average contract duration according to the USDOC's 1986 data), total
royalty payments from franchisee to franchisor would be $375,000. Thus,
the franchise fee would be just above 5% ($20,000/($20,000 + $375,000))
of the total payments from the franchisee to the franchisor over the life of
the contract (assuming no advertising fee).
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FIGURE 3: THE DISTRIBUTION OF FRANCHISE FEES IN 2006
(IN THOUSANDS OF 2001 U.S. DOLLARS)
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Table 3, infra, describes how initial franchise fees have changed
since 1980. Column 3 shows that the proportion of firms requesting an
initial franchise fee has increased during the 1980s to the point where
almost all franchisors now request such payments. But these fees have
always been quite popular: only about 10% of the chains did not request
them in 1980. The last four columns show the average and maximum
franchise fees observed in the data each year since 1980, in nominal and
then in real, 2001 U.S. dollars. Not surprisingly, in nominal terms, these
fees have increased over this period. In constant 2001 dollars, they
increased over most of the 1980s, but had decreased by more than $7,000
by 2001. In other words, nominal franchise fees did not keep up with the
rate of inflation in the 1990s. They have since gone back up to average
$24,000 in 2006, as they were at in the mid-1990s.
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TABLE 3: FRANCHISE FEES, 1980 TO 2006
Year N % of Mean Mean Maximum Maximum
franchisors Fee Fee, Fee Fee
with Nominal 2001 Nominal 2001
franchise U.S. $K (Real) U.S. $K (Real)
fee U.S. U.S. $K$K
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
2000
2001
2003
2004
2005
2006
952
1017
1136
1102
843
887
1032
1036
1005
1041
1082
1008
981
1075
1071
1090
1079
1015
971
959
1125
970
981
981
968
89.8
92.0
93.0
94.6
95.3
96.7
97.0
97.5
98.5
98.8
98.7
98.8
99.1
99.1
98.8
99.2
99.2
99.1
99.2
99.2
99.2
99.2
99.3
99.1
99.3
Note: Minima are always zero.
13.0
14.7
15.1
15.4
16.7
17.8
18.2
19.0
20.0
20.6
20.7
20.6
21.0
20.0
20.0
20.2
20.8
20.9
21.6
22.3
22.2
23.8
25.5
26.5
27.4
Data for
27.9
28.7
27.8
27.5
28.5
29.3
29.4
29.6
29.9
29.4
28.0
26.8
26.5
24.5
23.9
23.5
23.5
23.1
23.5
23.0
22.2
22.9
23.9
24.0
24.0
300.0
450.0
250.0
82.5
100.0
112.5
250.0
150.0
120.0
127.5
110.0
125.0
128.0
125.0
128.0
131.3
128.0
128.0
300.0
300.0
300.0
300.0
300.0
300.0
300.0
644.8
876.7
458.8
146.7
170.5
185.2
404.0
233.8
179.6
182.1
149.1
162.5
161.6
153.2
153.0
152.5
144.5
141.2
326.0
308.5
300.0
288.8
281.3
272.0
263.5
1999 and 2002 are unavailable as
the 2000 and 2003 Bond's Franchise Guide was not published for those
years.
2. Royalty Rates
In addition to collecting an initial franchise fee, business-format
franchisors typically require franchisees to make ongoing payments
throughout the life of their contracts. 75 In most, but not all franchise
systems, these payments are calculated as a percentage of sales revenues.76
In the Profile of Franchising, the IFA and the FRANdata Corporation
75 BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note t, at 6-8.
76 id.
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reported that 1006 franchisors, or 82% of their sample, requested some
form of percentage royalties. 77 They found that sixty-one franchisors, or
5% of their sample, instead charged a flat dollar amount per time period on
an ongoing basis, and twenty-two of them, or 2%, required a fee per unit
sold or per transaction (such as a fee per audit for an accounting firm, or per
room for a hotel).78 Finally, sixty-two franchisors, or 5% of the firms in
their sample, charged no royalties at all. 79 Among the 1,006 franchise
systems that operated under a percentage royalty, the report goes on to
mention that this fee was based on sales revenues for 932 franchisors, while
it was based on gross margins for another six franchisors.80 The remaining
fifty-two franchisors, almost all from the personnel, real estate, travel
agency, and business services sectors, used some other basis that the
authors do not describe.81
A number of franchisors that charge a percentage rate also specify
some minimum level of royalty payments. Such minimum payments are
the norm in other industries that use percentage fees, such as in retail
leasing.82 It is, however, difficult to ascertain the extent to which minimum
royalty payments are used in franchising. To our knowledge, the only
source of such information is Lafontaine's survey, where forty of the 123
franchisors that levied royalties said that franchisees must pay some
minimum dollar amount when their sales are too low.
83
Finally, a few franchisors that charge percentage fees rely on an
increasing or decreasing scale, making the percentage rate itself a function
of sales levels.8 4 Of the 117 franchisors that levied percentage royalties in
Lafontaine's survey, ninety-three charged a constant royalty rate no matter
what level of sales franchisees achieve, while eighteen franchisors used a
decreasing scale for royalties: that is a royalty rate that declines as outlet
sales reach certain target levels, and two used an increasing scale. 85 Both
the use of minimum royalty payments and of royalty rates that change as
sales reach given targets suggest that a number of franchisors find it useful
77 IFA EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION & FRANDATA CORP., THE PROFILE OF
FRANCHISING, VOLUME III (2000) [hereinafter PROFILE OF FRANCHISING 2000].
78 id.
79 Id,
80 Id.
81 One could speculate that this alternative basis for royalties would be some form of
net revenues to the franchisee as these sectors are ones where sales revenues to the
franchise are not the same thing as total receipts.
82 See, e.g., B. Peter Pashigian & Eric D. Gould, Internalizing Externalities: The
Pricing of Space in Shopping Malls, 41 J.L. & ECON. 115 (1998); William C. Wheaton,
Percentage Rent in Retail Leasing: The Alignment of Landlord-Tenant Interests, 26
REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS 185, 185-204 (2000) (describing the structure of retail
leases).
83 See Lafontaine, supra note 60, at 25.
8 id
.85 id.
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to introduce some non-linearity in their contract terms. Our data suggest
moreover that the use of varying rates may be on the rise: in 1980, only
forty-nine of the 938 franchisors for which we have royalty rate data
indicated a range of possible rates, whereas 114 franchisors (out of 1023)
gave a range in 1990, and 149 franchisors (out of 1085) gave one in 2001.
The proportion for 2006, at 138 out of 988, is slightly greater still.
Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine's detailed look at fifty-four disclosure
documents suggests that most royalty rate ranges reflect either decreasing
or increasing scales, or a policy of granting lower royalty rates for the first
few years of the franchisee's business.8 6
Figure 4, infra, shows the distribution of the average sales based
royalty rate for the 931 franchisors for which we have this information in
2006.87 It shows that royalty rates typically vary between 3 and 7%, and
that more than 28% of the franchisors (or 266 of them) charged the modal,
which is also the median, royalty rate of 5% percent. Interestingly, 8% of
business-format franchisors (seventy-five of them) do not require the
payment of any royalties at all. 88 Examples include Fantastic Sam's, Snap-
on Tools, Ben and Jerry's Ice Cream, and I Can't Believe It's Yogurt.
Some such franchisors, like Fantastic Sam's, instead require franchisees to
pay a fixed amount per week or month for the duration of the contract-we
explore this further below. Others obtain revenue from sales of goods to
their franchisees, just like traditional franchisors do.89
86 Bhattacharyya & Lafontaine, supra note 65.
87 Franchisors whose royalty rate was above 25% were excluded from the sample. The
data source does not always indicate whether the rates are applied to sales revenue, to
gross margins, or to profits. For the vast majority of franchisors, the rates are a
percentage of sales. However, percentage rates above 25% suggest the use of an
alternative basis, and I do not want to compare these with the sales-based rates or
include them in our reported averages. Again I use the mean value whenever a range of
royalty rates was given in the data source. I also impute minima and maxima when
these are not stated using the methodology described earlier for franchise fees.
88 See Figure 4, infra.
89 See Ram C. Rao & Shubashri Srinivasan, Why are Royalty Rates Higher in Service-
Type Franchises, 4 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 7 (1995) (arguing that retail
franchised chains charge lower royalty rates than those in services industries because
the former have an alternative mechanism at their disposal to extract revenues from
their franchisees, namely they can sell inputs to franchisees at a markup). See also
Lafontaine, supra note 90 (providing discussion and related evidence).
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At the other extreme, a few franchisors do charge as much as 25%
in royalties.90 As noted above, we eliminated from our sample those
franchisors that charged even higher royalty rates on the presumption that
these likely were levied on gross margins or profits rather than sales.
Unfortunately, our data source does not specifically indicate whether the
rates are applied to sales revenue, to gross margins, or to profits. Thus,
firms with royalty rates of 15, 20, or 25% in our data may also be extracting
a proportion of profit or gross margins rather than sales. Having
communicated with some of these franchisors, however, we know that these
high rates also can be percentages of sales royalties as well. Thus, we
chose to include them in our analyses as long as their rates were not above
25%. We simply note that such high rates leave little for franchisees to pay
expenses and still earn normal profits. These businesses then tend to be
concentrated in home-based, low overhead types of activities. 9'
90 See Figure 4, supra.
91 As such businesses tend to be service rather than retail based, the high royalty rates
that arise in low overhead businesses also explain part of the pattern noted by Rao &
Srinivasan, supra note 90.
The Evolution of Franchising
Table 4 shows how the usage of sales royalty and the average rate
charged have changed from 1980 to 2006. Of course, the proportion of
franchisors using sales royalties was quite high even in 1980. Nonetheless,
it increased steadily until it reached about 92% of franchisors in the early
and mid-1990s, where it has stayed since. In The Franchise Agreement,
Udell documented that 76% of the fast-food firms in his sample required
the payment of percentage royalties, usually between 2 to 5% of sales,
suggesting that the reliance on percentage fees may have increased through
the 1970s as well.92 In the early 1970s, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that a franchisor mandating the purchase by the
franchisee of its marked up products that were severable from the
trademark itself was a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 93 This
likely encouraged a switch toward more royalty fees from the early 1970s
onward.
Table 4 also shows that the average royalty rate has increased
slightly, from about 4.5% in 1980 to 5.2 or 5.3% in 2006, in part because
the proportion of firms with zero royalty rates decreased (see column 6).
Finally, column 7 shows the number of franchisors that do not request any
percentage royalty but instead charge ongoing fixed fees. The data indicate
that, in the early 1980s, approximately one out of every four franchisors
that did not request a percent royalty payment charged ongoing fixed fees.
By the late 1980s, however, one out of every two such firms used ongoing
fixed fees instead of sales-based fees. Thus, by the early 1990s, and since
then, 96% of franchisors charged royalties, either as a percentage or
ongoing fixed fees, whereas only 89% of franchisors did so in 1980.
92 Gerald G. Udell, The Franchise Agreement, CORNELL HOTEL AND RESTAURANT
ADMINISTRATION QUARTERLY, Aug. 1972, at 13, 14.
93 Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).
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TABLE 4: ROYALTY RATES, 1980 TO 2006
Year Number of % of Mean Maximum # of # of
franchisors N with Royalty Royalty franchisors franchisors
in the data non- Rate Rate with zero with no
zero royalty royalty but
sales rate positive
royalty ongoing
payments
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
2000
2001
2003
2004
2005
2006
938
1016
1141
1093
821
853
988
1006
963
993
1023
948
928
1035
1035
1045
1045
982
942
927
1085
935
940
942
931
85.7
87.1
87.9
88.9
87.3
90.6
90.4
90.4
91.7
91.2
90.8
91.4
90.9
90.4
89.9
90.7
91.2
91.6
91.3
92.0
91.9
91.7
91.4
91.4
91.9
22.5
22.5
25
25
25
22
25
25
22
22
22
22
22
25
22.4
22.4
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
28
30
37
46
37
29
31
39
37
46
49
44
40
52
55
54
47
44
44
37
48
40
43
43
39
More details on the amount of ongoing fixed fees are found in
Table 5, infra. Specifically, this table shows the frequency with which such
fees have been used, and the amounts requested, between 1980 and 2006.
Column 3 shows the total number of firms requesting such fees, and the
proportion of the sample they represent, regardless of what other fees the
franchisor may charge. The data in this column confirm that ongoing fixed
fees are the exception rather than the rule. The proportion of firms that rely
on ongoing fixed payments is low and has remained quite stable, around 6
to 7%, since at least the mid-1980s. Moreover, a comparison of the number
of franchisors that use fixed payments with the number of franchisors that
charge a zero royalty rate and use such fees, per column 7 of Table 4,
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of Table 4, reveals that one-third to one-half of the franchisors that rely on
ongoing fixed payments collect those along with non-zero royalty
payments.
The next four columns in Table 5 show the average amounts
involved, per month, both in nominal and in real (2001) U.S. dollars, first
across all firms in the data (columns 4 and 5) and then for those firms that
use these types of fees only (columns 6 and 7). Focusing on the latter, it is
clear that the average fee charged by firms that utilize these fees has
remained about the same in nominal terms over much of this period, though
it has increased somewhat in the last few years. Hence, in real terms, there
has been a steady and important reduction in the amount of fixed ongoing
payments from an average of approximately about $1000 per month to
approximately $500 per month by 2001, a trend that is now being reversed.
The downward trend, however, was due mostly to the disappearance of a
few franchisors that charged very high ongoing fees. When one examines
the size of these fees on average for all franchisors (i.e., across all firms in
the data as per columns 4 and 5), one finds that, in real terms, the average
monthly amounts collected increased slightly in the mid-1980s and then
decreased. By 2001, these fees were back to about the same level on
average as they were in the early 1980s. Consistent with the larger amounts
charged per columns 6 and 7, by 2006, the average fixed payments overall
seem to have risen slightly.
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TABLE 5: ONGOING FIXED PAYMENTS, PER MONTH, IN 2001 U.S. DOLLARS
Year N # of Mean Mean Mean Mean
franchisors fixed fee, fixed fee, fixed fee fixed
(and % of all all when fee
N) with franchisors franchisors used when
ongoing (nominal) (real, 2001 (nominal) used
fixed $) (real,
payments 2001
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
2000
2001
2003
2004
2005
2006
1089
1100
1220
1169
880
926
1075
1075
1023
1059
1096
1017
992
1088
1090
1096
1092
1022
995
984
1158
994
1002
998
980
40 (3.7)
46 (4.2)
58 (4.8)
75 (6.4)
63 (7.2)
55 (5.9)
60 (5.6)
69 (6.4)
61 (6.0)
64 (6.0)
71 (6.5)
64 (6.2)
61 (6.1)
86 (6.8)
90 (7.3)
93 (7.8)
84 (6.7)
82 (6.9)
76 (7.6)
67 (6.8)
82 (7.1)
77 (7.7)
80 (8.0)
78 (7.8)
73 (7.4)
17.7
17.0
19.9
36.4
39.2
33.4
38.6
33.0
32.3
29.3
35.5
37.3
33.5
33.5
35.7
41.2
31.4
29.3
36.0
33.5
34.1
35.3
46.7
45.5
47.2
38.0
33.2
36.5
64.8
66.9
54.9
62.4
51.5
48.4
41.9
48.0
48.5
42.3
41.1
42.6
47.9
35.4
32.3
39.1
34.5
34.1
33.9
43.8
41.3
41.5
481.2
407.5
418.7
567.7
548.2
562.1
692.4
514.4
542.5
485.2
547.4
601.9
545.3
493.2
486.0
531.7
469.3
421.5
470.8
492.4
481.6
455.3
584.5
582.5
634.3
1034.2
793.9
768.4
1009.4
934.4
925.2
1118.9
801.9
812.2
692.9
741.7
782.7
688.3
604.5
580.8
617.9
529.7
465.1
511.5
506.4
481.6
438.2
548.0
528.2
557.2
3. Advertising Fees
In addition to charging an initial franchise fee and running
royalties, many franchisors also stipulate in their contracts that the
franchisee must contribute monies to support national, regional and/or local
advertising. For local advertising, the contributions are often stated as
minima: the franchisor requires that the franchisee spend at least x percent
of its sales revenues, or at least $x, on local advertising. For advertising
fees generally, franchisors often state in their disclosure documents that the
rates may be changed later, or, for those that do not require an advertising
contribution, that an advertising fund may be instituted later, at the
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discretion of the franchisor. Franchisors thus leave themselves much
leeway in this part of their financial dealings with franchisees. Contrary to
franchise fees, which may vary across franchisees in a chain, this leeway
relates to the franchisor's ability to make changes over time rather than to
treat different franchisees differently.94
Like royalty payments, advertising fees are most often calculated as
a constant proportion of the franchisees' sales revenues. But as with
royalty payments, advertising fees are also sometimes specified as a fixed
monthly or weekly amount, or calculated as a function of the number of
transactions. In the Profile of Franchising 2000, the IFA and the
FRANdata Corp. found that 634 (or 52%) of the 1221 franchisors for which
they had advertising fee data required that franchisees pay a percentage of
their sales toward advertising.95 The remaining franchisors either required
no contribution at all (340, or 28%), contributions only to local or regional
advertising funds (149, or 12%), a flat fee (66, or 5% of them), or a per
transaction fee (13, or 1% of the sample).96 The remaining few firms used
some other unspecified basis to calculate the advertising requirement.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the advertising fees as a percent
of sales for the 890 firms in our data with advertising fee information in
2006. This distribution first confirms what was reported in the Profile of
Franchising 2000, namely that many franchisors (225, or 25% of the
franchisors in the data in 2006) do not charge any advertising fee.97
Advertising fees also are rather low relative to royalty rates. Of the firms
that charge an advertising fee, the majority (412 out of 665, or 62%) set it at
a level of 2% or less. Almost all firms set this'fee below 5%, the modal
(and median) royalty rate. These patterns are consistent with those reported
in the Profile of Franchising 2000, where 68% of the firms that used a
percentage of sales advertising fee in 1998 charged 2% or less, while 98%
of them requested fees below 5%.98
94 See Bhattacharyya & Lafontaine, supra note 65, at 761.
95 PROFILE OF FRANCHISING 2000, supra note 77, at 154.
96 Id.
97 Id.
9 8 1d. at 160.
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FIGURE 5: DISTRIBUTION OF PERCENT OF SALES ADVERTISING FEES, 2006
LL- /t I- " I- t- . I- " I 1. L. , 1. 4 L "
Advertising Rate (O/o of sales)
Table 6 shows how the frequency and amounts of advertising fees
have changed between 1980 and 2006. 99 The mean advertising fee has
gone up substantially, but column 6 shows that this again is due to the
increasing number of firms that request such fees. The average advertising
fee charged by users of such fees, on the other hand, has not changed over
time. The last two columns of this table also show that the number of
franchisors that charge ongoing fixed payments represents an increasing
proportion of all franchisors with no advertising fee. This is because the
number of franchisors requesting ongoing fixed payments has remained
quite stable while the number of franchisors that do not specify a separate
advertising fee has decreased substantially over the period of the data.
99 A steadily increasing number of franchisors also report a range of advertising fees in
the data rather than a single value. As we did for the other fees, we rely on the average
rate in those cases where a range is given, and we impute minima and maxima when
these are not stated explicitly.
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TABLE 6: ADVERTISING RATES, 1980 TO 2006
Year N % Mean Max # # of
franchisors franchisors franchisors
with > 0 with with adv.
adv. rate adv. rate = rate = 0
0 but
positive
fixed
payments
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
2000
2001
2003
2004
2005
2006
925
1026
1167
1114
830
873
1024
1043
986
1018
1046
972
952
1038
1021
1007
979
926
894
876
1028
903
907
903
890
44.2
48.5
52.5
54.9
58.3
60.1
64.7
65.2
68.4
67.6
68.9
68.2
66.7
68.1
67.0
67.9
71.2
70.5
71.9
72.7
71.9
72.1
72.4
73.0
74.7
13.0
16.3
16.3
16.3
13.0
10.0
13.0
12.0
13.0
15.0
15.0
14.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
14.0
20.0
20.0
20.0
20.0
516
528
554
502
346
348
361
363
312
330
325
309
317
331
337
323
282
273
251
239
289
252
250
244
225
37
46
55
71
59
48
53
65
55
56
61
57
55
67
74
76
65
61
66
59
69
66
71
69
64
Finally, while advertising fees are often specified and administered
separately from royalty payments, from a franchisee's perspective it is the
sum of these fees that really matters-this sum determines the portion of
each dollar of sales revenue that must be sent back to the franchisor. It is
also the sum of these percentage-of-sales fees that then affects the
franchisee's decisions at the margin. Moreover, from the franchisor's
perspective, advertising expenditures are not bound by the amount collected
specifically for this purpose. In chains that do not specify such a fee,
franchisors still spend money on advertising. In other words, not all
franchisors necessarily draw a clear distinction between royalty revenue
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and advertising related funds, especially early in our sample period.'00 For
these reasons, in Figure 6, infra, we present the distribution of the sum of
royalty and advertising rates in 2006.
This figure shows that most franchisees paid somewhere between
four and ten cents of every dollar of sales in the form of royalties and/or
advertising fees to their franchisor in 2006, with a median total rate of 7%
and a modal rate of 8%. Only fifty-two franchisors (6%) do not charge any
royalty or advertising fee based on sales. On the other hand, few
franchisors (twenty-one out of 868) require contributions that add up to
more than 15% of a franchisee's sales revenues.
In The Economics of Franchising, Blair and Lafontaine discuss
how high total rates are used relatively more frequently in service industries
such as education, health and fitness, personal services, the automotive and
the maintenance sectors.' 0' Franchisors in retail businesses, in contrast,
tend to rely on relatively lower total rates. The data suggest that franchisors
that choose a low royalty rate do not "make it up" by choosing a
comparatively high advertising rate, or vice versa. In fact, high royalty and
advertising rates generally go hand in hand.
'0 See generally Robert E. Stassen & Robert A. Middelstaedt, Do Franchise Systems
Advertise Enough? US. Restaurant Expenditures and Performance 1989 to 1998, 10 J.
MARKETING CHANNELS - (2002) at 3-18; BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note ", at 69-78,
Chapter 9 (providing background information on advertising fees and advertising in
franchising).101 BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note t, at 75.
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FIGURE 6: ROYALTY AND ADVERTISING RATES, 2006
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4. Additional Remarks Concerning Financial Contract Terms
In The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel
Data, Lafontaine and Shaw found that while franchise fees and royalty rates
vary across franchisors, they remain quite stable over time within
franchised chains.'0 2 In fact, franchisors do not systematically increase or
decrease their royalty rates or franchise fees as they become better
established, whether this is measured in number of years in franchising or
in terms of total outlets. The tendency instead is to keep the fees, especially
the percentage-of-sales fees, relatively constant. Thus, the uniformity in
fees described earlier across franchisees within a chain also applies over
time within a chain. Second, the theoretical literature on franchising implies
that everything else constant, and in particular holding constant the value of
the franchise, sales-based fees and initial franchise fees should be
negatively correlated.10 3 In other words, if the franchise fee is high, the
running royalty will be low, and vice versa. The reason, of course, is that
102 Francine Lafontaine & Kathryn L. Shaw, The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting:
Evidence from Panel Data, 107 J. POL. ECON. 1041, 1041 (1999).
103 BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note t, at 80.
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these are alternative mechanisms for extracting profit from the franchisee,
and there is only so much such profit. As we saw earlier, sometimes
franchisors rely on fixed payments in lieu of a percentage royalty or
advertising fee, in which case the use of fixed payments and percentage
fees is by definition negatively correlated. More generally, however, the
negative relationship between fixed fees and royalty rates has been quite
elusive. 104 Of course, the lack of an observed negative relationship may
arise from differences in contract terms that affect both fees in similar ways
and are not controlled for in these analyses. But even looking at changes
within firms, Lafontaine and Shaw find no relationship between total
percentage fees and initial franchise fees. 10 5 In fact, the empirical evidence
suggests that franchise fees are set quite independently from sales-based
fees. 10 6 The absence of a negative relationship between the two types of
fees suggests that the franchise fee may not be set at a level to extract all of
the economic profit that franchisees earn. 10 7  This would occur if
franchisors mostly set their initial franchise fee to compensate them for the
costs incurred in setting up the outlet.108
Finally, studies of franchise practices outside the United States
suggest that the basic types of fees, the extent to which they are used, and
their levels are similar to those described above for the United States. For
example, the many Canadian franchisors that are included in the data
described above set the same types of fees and set them at levels that are
quite similar to those chosen by U.S. franchisors. Pnard, Raynaud and
Saussier examined the fees used by more than 200 franchisors in France
and found that most of them also use percentage of sales royalties and
initial franchise fees, though the latter appear to be slightly lower in
'04 See, e.g., Lafontaine, supra note 59, at 263; Patrick J. Kaufmann & Rajiv P. Dant,
The Pricing of Franchise Rights, 77 J. RETAILING 423, 424 (2001); Kabir C. Sen, The
Use of Initial Fees and Royalties in Business Format Franchising, 14 MANAGERIAL &
DECISION ECON. 175, 189 (1993).
105 Lafontaine & Shaw, supra note 102, at 1041.
106 James A. Brickley, Royalty Rates and Upfront Fees in Share Contracts: Evidence
from Franchising, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 511 (2002) (finding some evidence that
franchisors headquartered in termination states charge significantly higher royalty rates
combined with a lower franchise fee).
107 See generally Patrick J. Kaufmann & Francine Lafontaine, Costs of Control: The
Source of Economic Rents for McDonald's Franchisees, 37 J.L. & ECON. 414 (1994);
Lafontaine & Raynaud, supra note 30, at 317 (arguing that downstream profit
combined with monitoring and termination rights, on the one hand, and residual claims
on the other hand, are complementary incentive mechanisms in franchised chains, i.e.
they are used to reinforce one another); Steven C. Michael & Hollie J. Moore, Returns
to Franchising, 2 J. CORP. FIN. 133 (1995) (citing evidence that franchisees earn
economic profit at least in some franchised systems and for discussion of the reasons
why franchisors many choose to leave profit with their franchisees).
108 BOND, BOND'S FRANCHISE GUIDE 24 (2008 ed.), supra note 69.
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France. 0 9 Frazer shows that while the same types and levels of fees are
used by franchisors in Australia, there is a greater reliance on ongoing fixed
payments as 17% of the firms in her sample of 262 franchisors rely on such
payments compared to just 7% of franchisors doing the same in our data. 0
Finally, Seaton's data show that the fees of 161 franchisors in the United
Kingdom in 1998 are very similar on average, and follow the same general
distribution, as the ones found here for U.S. and Canadian franchisors."'
Moreover, the conclusions about the lack of correlation between the fees
and their stability over time also apply to non-U.S. franchisors.
Specifically, Gagn6, et al., establish a lack of negative correlation in fees
for franchisors operating in Quebec, Canada, 12 while Seaton's analyses
indicate that the fees used by franchisors in the United Kingdom are also
not negatively correlated and do not change much over time either."
3
B. Non-Monetary Contract Terms
Aside from the set of financial contract terms described above,
franchise contracts contain numerous clauses governing the obligations of
both parties during and after the contract period, including clauses relating
to the location of the franchise, how the franchisee is expected to operate
the franchise, whether or not the franchisee has an exclusive territory, who
owns or leases the property, the duration of the agreement and the
circumstances under which the franchisor or franchisee may terminate it,
when and where the franchisee may open another business, and so on. We
describe some of these contractual obligations and clauses in what
follows. 14 Since there is much less data on contractual obligations and
'
09 Thierry Pnard, Emmanuel Raynaud & St~phane Saussier, Dual Distribution and
Royalty Rates in Franchised Chains, (2002), available at
http://www.isnie.org/ISNIE02/PapersO2/penardraynaudsaussier.pdf. For more
information on advertising fees in franchising in France, see FEDERATION FRANCAISE
DE LA FRANCHISE, supra note 29.
10 Lorelle Frazer, Motivations for Franchisors to Use Flat continuing Franchise Fees,
15 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 587, 589 (1998).
111 See Jonathan S. Seaton, An Analysis of UK Franchise Contracting 1989-1999, 24
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 25, 27 (2003).
112 See generally Robert Gagn6, Simon Pierre Sigue, & Georges Zaccour, Droit
d'Entr~e et Taux de Redevance dans les Franchises d'Exploitation au Qubec, 74
L'ACTUALITE ECONOMIQUE/REVUE D'ANALYSE ECONOMIQUE 651, (1998).
113 Seaton, supra note 111, at 33-34.
114 A few franchise contract clauses, such as choice of law or mandatory arbitration
clauses, relate to interpretation and enforcement rather than defining the franchise
relationship itself or its economic underpinnings. Readers interested in learning more
about such contract clauses, or about franchise law, would do well to consult a legal
treatise such as W. MICHAEL. GARNER, FRANCHISE AND DISTRIBUTION LAW AND
PRACTICE (Thompson West 2002). See also PHILIP F. ZEIDMAN, SURVEY OF FOREIGN
LAWS AND REGULATIONS AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING (American Bar
Association 1989) (providing an overview of laws that affect franchising in a number of
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clauses and in particular on changes in these over time, we focus more on
describing their use and less on their evolution over time. However, non-
financial contract terms are also those that franchisors have adjusted at
times in response to, or as ways to avoid or reduce, franchisor-franchisee
conflict. We therefore discuss their evolution in light of such conflict and
legal ramifications.
1. Mandatory Purchase Requirements
Table 7 shows the frequency of mandatory purchase
requirements115 in business format franchising in 1988 and 1989, the only
years for which information on such requirements is available.' 16  Not
surprisingly, the data show that franchisors involved in various types of
retailing, including those in the health and fitness sector and food retail,
tend to impose such requirements rather frequently. In contrast, franchised
chains that sell services, such as those in the business, hotel and motel,
rental, and real estate services sectors, typically do not require that
franchisees buy any inputs from them.
One study examined the disclosure documents of 100 restaurant
and fast-food franchisors to provide more detailed evidence on tying in
these sectors.1"7 Of the 100 chains whose documents were analyzed, thirty
imposed a requirement that the franchisee purchase some product from the
franchisor.1 8  Franchisors that used purchase requirements were found
disproportionately among the chicken, pizza, sandwiches, seafood and sit-
down restaurant chains while very few hamburger and hot dog chains and
Mexican restaurants had such requirements. 119 Among the thirty firms with
purchase requirements, he found that on average the amount of purchases
that were required represented about 8.4% of all the wholesale purchases of
the franchisees.12 Most of the franchisors in the chicken, pizza and seafood
different countries); Jonathan Klick, Bruce Kobayashi & Larry Ribstein, The Effect of
Contract Regulation: the Case of Franchising (George Mason Law & Economics
Research Paper No. 07-03, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=951464 (last
visited Mar. 14, 2009) (analyzing the effect of termination laws on the use of these
clauses).
"5 Such requirements are often termed tying (or tie-in) requirements. The franchise
license is sold to a franchisee on the condition that he or she also buys the specified
items from the franchisor. The license is the tying good while the required items are the
tied goods. See BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note t, at 139.
116Id. at 140-41, citing BOND (1989, 1990-91 eds.), supra note 69. The data was
obtained for 1988 and 1989. As only a subset of the firms in Entrepreneur Magazine's
Franchise 500 - the main source of data for 1988 and 1989 - also appear in the
corresponding Bond publication, the sample sizes for this variable are reduced to 643
and 630, respectively.
"17 Steven C. Michael, The Extent, Motivation, and Effect of Tying in Franchise
Contracts, 21 MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECON. 191 (2000).
l81d
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fast-food sectors, however, only imposed requirements for spices, batter, or
sauces.' 2' Firms with the largest proportions of wholesale purchases
subjected to a tie tended to be those that sold some proprietary products,
such as batter for pancake houses, bread for sandwich shops (e.g., Subway),
or ice cream for family restaurants (e.g., Brigham's and Howard
Johnson).122
This result, that franchisors now rarely impose purchase
requirements for non-proprietary product, is most likely due to the Siegel v.
Chicken Delight decision mentioned earlier. 23 This decision led to a
systematic decrease in the amount of franchisee profit that franchisors could
extract via purchase requirements, and a likely corresponding increase in
royalty rates, as mentioned above.
TABLE 7: MANDATORY PURCHASE REQUIREMENTS
1988 1989
Firms Firms
Sector N With Percent N With Percent
Automotive 56 13 23.2 54 14 25.9
Business 96 19 19.8 93 14 15.1
Contractors 18 7 38.9 20 7 35.0
Cosmetic 14 3 21.4 17 4 23.5
Education 8 1 12.5 12 5 41.7
Fast Food 119 51 42.9 112 45 40.2
Health & Fitness 20 11 55.0 12 6 50.0
Home Furnishings 14 4 28.6 14 4 28.6
Hotels & Motels 9 1 11.1 5 1 20.0
Maintenance 45 12 26.7 47 16 34.0
Personal
Services 52 14 26.9 56 14 25.0
Real Estate 15 1 6.7 17 5 29.4
Recreation 11 4 36.4 11 5 45.5
Rental 15 2 13.3 18 3 16.7
Restaurants 37 16 43.2 39 18 46.2
Retail Food 22 13 59.1 22 12 54.5
Retail Other 92 22 23.9 81 24 29.6
Total 643 194 30.2 630 197 31.3
2. Territorial Protection
A number of franchisors offer exclusive territories to franchisees,
that is, they guarantee that they will not open another unit within a certain
121 id.
122 id.
123 Siegel, 448 F.2d at 46.
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area around the franchisee's business. 124 Until the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Continental T.V v. GTE Sylvania Inc., such territorial
guarantees would have been per se illegal under U.S. antitrust laws.
125
Since then, however, non-price vertical restraints, such as exclusive
territories, have been analyzed under the rule of reason.
126
Table 8, infra, shows the frequency with which franchisors in different
industries offer an exclusive territory to their franchisees according to the
Profile of Franchising 2000.127 Any form of exclusive territory, described
by geography, population, miles, or number of vehicles, is counted as a yes
in this table.
. Table 8 shows that the majority of franchisors offer some form of
territorial protection to their franchisees. Since the industry (or sector)
definitions are rather broad, the average frequency of territorial protection
surely masks a good deal of within-sector variance. Despite this, Table 8
also shows substantial variation in the use of exclusive territories across
industry sectors. In particular, in franchising sectors such as personnel
services, franchisees specifically purchase the right to be the sole provider
of personnel for businesses that operate in a specified territory. The same
tends to be true in education related and service businesses more generally.
Thus, most franchisors in those industries include territorial protections in
their contracts. But even in mobile businesses, exclusivity is not a given. In
one example, a franchisee in the mobile windshield repair industry found
that his franchise agreement did not guarantee him any exclusive
territory. 128 At the other extreme, in sectors such as lodging, food, retail,
and fast food, there is no explicit territory embedded in the definition of the
124 This is common, for example, in the beer industry. Wholesale beer distributors
usually are granted exclusive territories that contractually protect them from dual
distribution (or non-traditional encroachment) as well as from distributors in adjacent
territories. These arrangements have been found to be efficient in the sense of
promoting greater sales. See Tim R. Sass & David S. Saurman, Efficiency Effects of
Exclusive Territories: Evidence from the Indiana Beer Market, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 597,
597 (1996); Tim R. Sass & David S. Saurman, Mandated Exclusive Territories and
Economic Efficiency: An Empirical Analysis of the Malt-Beverage Industry, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 153, 154 (1993) [hereinafter Sass & Saurman, Mandated Exclusive Territories].
125 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977).
126 See The Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806 (2007) at the
federal level (pertaining to special industry state laws in automotive and liquor
distribution provide territorial protection to dealers); Richard L. Smith 11, Franchise
Regulation: An Economic Analysis of State Restrictions on Automobile Distribution, 25
J.L. & ECON. 125 (1982) (citing evidence that the resulting territorial exclusivity for car
dealers has led to higher car prices and lower service, namely fewer hours of operation,
for customers). See also Sass & Saurman, Mandated Exclusive Territories, supra note
124, at 154 (showing that territorial exclusivity has pro-competitive consequences in
the beer industry).
127 PROFILE OF FRANCHISING 2000, supra note 77, at 185.
128 Lee H. Murphy, Close Quarters Irk Franchisees, CRAIN'S CHICAGO BUSINESS, June
12, 2000, at SB8.
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business, and a larger proportion of franchisors choose not to offer any
exclusive territory.
TABLE 8: EXCLUSIVE TERRITORIES
Number with
Number of Exclusive Territories
Sector Franchisors %
Automotive 93 67 72
Baked Goods 29 20 69
Building & 80 71 89
Construction
Business Services 64 46 72
Children Products 33 29 88
and Services
Education Products 19 17 89
and Services
Fast Food 219 151 69
Lodging 60 21 35
Maintenance Services 90 62 69
Personnel Services 33 31 94
Printing 18 14 78
Real Estate 36 21 58
Restaurants 106 83 78
Retail Food 57 28 49
Retail Non-food 139 97 70
Service Businesses 109 87 80
Sports and Recreation 30 27 90
Travel 11 2 18
Total 1226 874 71
Source: PROFILE OF FRANCHIS[NG, 2000, supra note 77, at 184. Exclusive
territories are defined as per item 12 of UFOC. Any territory, described by
geography, population, miles, or number of vehicles counts as a yes. No
means territory is limited to the store.
It is undeniable that exclusive territories provide some security to
franchisees, or at least communicates to them more clearly how the
franchisor's future plans may affect them. It is perhaps not surprising then
that Azoulay and Shane find that a contractual guarantee of an exclusive
territory significantly increases the likelihood that new franchised chains
survive beyond their first few years in business. 29 They interpret their
finding to mean that territorial protection is so important to franchisees that
129 Pierre Azoulay & Scott Shane, Entrepreneurs, Contracts, and the Failure of Young
Firms, 47 MGMT. Scl. 337, 337 (2001).
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those franchisors that fail to offer such protection from encroachment 130 are
unable to attract franchisees, which then leads to their failure.
131
In a 1993 study of territorial restrictions described in chains'
disclosure documents, the FRANdata Corp. found that only twenty-six of
the largest fifty restaurant franchisors offered some territorial exclusivity.
1 32
This is much lower than the 80% reported for the sit-down restaurant
industry in Table 8, and still lower than the 69% reported for the fast-food
industry.133 In contrast, for a set of 170 new franchisors from a variety of
business sectors, Azoulay and Shane found 83.5% offering exclusive
territories as compared to an overall rate of 73% in Table 8.134 Together,
these data imply that larger franchisors, for whom claims of encroachment
are more likely to be an issue, yet have a lower tendency than average to
offer territorial protection. New franchisors, in contrast, offer protections
more often than average, potentially to counteract the likely negative effect
of their newness and small size on franchisee recruiting. Anecdotal
evidence further supports this conclusion: while Ray Kroc offered
territories to early McDonald's franchisees, he reduced the size of the
territories over time and then eliminated them entirely by 1969.135
The desire to maintain flexibility in developing a franchised system
is the main reason franchisors give for not granting exclusive territories to
franchisees. 136 But the need for flexibility as the market grows is not the
only source of encroachment friction. Azoulay and Shane report that the
main concern of franchisors that did not offer exclusive territories was that
"exclusivity would allow franchisees to hold them up through
underdevelopment."1 37 They cite the rationale of one franchisor: "If they
(franchisees) can't afford new stores and they don't operate well, they will
slow down our growth if we can't put someone else in the area."'' 38 In other
words, development may be postponed due to liquidity constraints or, even
worse, because a particular franchisee is not talented or ambitious enough
130 Encroachment occurs when a new unit of the same chain is located "too close" to an
incumbent unit. "Too close," in turn, means that the incumbent's business is impaired.
For a thorough analysis of encroachment issues in franchising see BLAIR &
LAFONTAINE, supra note t, at Chapter 8.
131 Azoulay & Shane, supra note 129, at 355.
132 FRANdata Corp. study cited in Encroachment Issues in the Restaurant Industry,nd
FRANCHISE UPDATE, (2 Quarter 1994), at 14.133 Table 8, supra.
134 See Azoulay & Shane, supra note 129, at 344.
135 JoHN F. LOVE, MCDONALD'S: BEHIND THE ARCHES 274 (1986).
136See, e.g., Frank Mathewson & Ralph Winter, Territorial Restrictions in Franchise
Contracts, 32 ECON. INQUIRY 181, 192 (1994) (model emphasizing the role of exclusive
territories in determining the starting point of future renegotiation processes in franchise
relationships).
13' Azoulay & Shane, supra note 129, at 353.U38 Ild.
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to operate more stores. Such concerns clearly make it harder for
franchisors to provide guarantees at the start of the franchise relationship.
The problem, however, is not insurmountable. In particular, grants of
exclusive territories can be made contingent upon some objective measures
of franchisee performance. This is fairly common, for example, in master
franchise agreements-these contracts not only provide territorial
guarantees to the franchisee, they also stipulate a development schedule
within the territory in question. Thus, the franchisor evaluates the
franchisee's performance using the number of outlets opened as the
performance measure, and the territorial guarantee is predicated on this
number reaching specific target values over time. The drawback of course
is that these targets may be unrealistic thereby causing the master franchise
agreement to fail. 139 A more flexible approach would involve more regular
assessment of the market and its potential. In any case, franchisors should
state explicitly what they consider to be reasonable sales and profit levels
per outlet, and franchisees should know that new outlets will be added
when outlet sales in the region go above these levels. 140 These types of
safeguards for franchisors and franchisees go much beyond the simple grant
of a territory and are more closely aligned with other types of practices that
franchisors currently use to minimize tension over geographic and other
forms of expansion.
3. Clauses Relating to Non-Traditional Encroachment
In its study of the fifty largest fast-food franchisors in the United
States, FRANdata Corp. found that twenty-six offered exclusive
territories.1 41  These twenty-six, however, all reserved some rights to
themselves, even within the franchisee's territory. 142 Most common were
franchisor rights to develop franchises under different trade names
(eighteen of the twenty-six franchisors) and the right to develop
institutional locations, such as those in stadiums, hospitals, airports, etc.
(nine of the twenty-six franchisors). 143 Further, among the full set of fifty
franchisors, thirty-one explicitly reserved the right to sell their products
through alternative channels.' 44
139 See Arturs Kalnins, Overestimation and Venture Survival: An Empirical Analysis of
Development Commitments in International Master Franchising Ventures, 14 J. ECON.
& MGMT. STRATEGY 933, (2005) (attributing the frequency of failure of master
franchise agreements in international markets to development schedules that are too
aggressive.).
140 Of course, franchisors again will need to be wary of franchisees providing low effort
to keep their outlet sales below the level that will lead the franchisor to want more
outlets.
141 FRANdata Corp, supra note 132, at 14.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144id
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These different rights that franchisors embed in their contracts
make it clear that they feel a need to reserve for themselves the right to
respond to new market opportunities or challenges as they see fit. This is
because a franchised chain's long-term survival and growth is intrinsically
tied to the franchisor's market strategy as well as its capacity to adapt to
changing circumstances. But franchisees may not benefit at all from the
resulting changes and, if they do, they may not benefit equally. For
example, when Popeye's acquired Church's Fried Chicken, some Popeye's
franchisees sued their franchisor, America's Favorite Chicken Co., because
the new strategy of the firm was to specialize the two chains: Popeye's for
quality and Church's for value. 45 The plaintiff Popeye's franchisees were
in markets where they believed a value strategy like that of Church's would
be more profitable.1 46 The court found for the franchisor, however, as the
terms of the contract were quite clear: the franchisor could run outlets under
different marks in the franchisee's territory. 147 Moreover, the court noted
that the franchisor believed its strategy was best for the two chains and said
that even if America's Favorite Chicken's "marketing strategy for the
Popeye's system ha[d] made [the franchisee] less competitive" in his
market, it did not constitute bad faith.1
48
Claims of non-traditional encroachment, however, do not arise only
in merger situations. They can come up any time franchisors react to
market opportunities in ways that either do not benefit, or directly impinge,
on their franchisees' businesses. Examples have included franchisors that:
(1) use alternative channels such as supermarkets or the internet; (2) serve
national accounts or business customers directly without resorting to
franchisees; (3) establish outlets in non-traditional settings; or (4) operate
competing brands obtained through acquisition or internal development. In
all cases, franchisees worry about losing business to these alternatives while
franchisors argue that the increased visibility of the brand brings additional
customers and prevents competing brands from entering into the same
markets. When the same franchisor develops competing brands, the
franchisor usually relies on arguments of efficiency, or may argue that the
offerings of the different franchise concepts target different market
segments and thus complement one another. Whether the development of
these alternative channels and other brand development activities turn out to
be good or bad for an individual outlet, or even the chain, will again depend
on the specific market situation and the way in which the franchisor
organizes these activities.
The precedents established in legal disputes over geographic
encroachment generally apply to non-traditional encroachment.
Specifically, the courts have ruled that where a franchisor has expressly
141 Clark v. America's Favorite Chicken Co., 110 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1997).
146 Id. at 296.
147 Id. at 297-99.
141 Id. at 298-99.
The Evolution of Franchising
reserved in the contract the right to distribute its product through alternative
channels, the provision is enforceable. For example, in the land-mark
Hdagen-Dazs cases, franchisees sued after Pillsbury decided to start mass
distribution of its ice cream via supermarkets. 149 The franchise agreement,
however, provided that "the Haagen-Dazs trademark owner [i.e. Pillsbury]
has the right and may distribute products identified by the Haagen-Dazs
trademarks through not only Haagen-Dazs shops but through any other
distribution method which may from time to time be established."' 50 Given
the specific terms of this agreement, the court found in favor of Pillsbury.
Similarly, in the case of America's Favorite Chicken Co., supra, the court
ruled for the franchisor given that the franchise agreement explicitly
reserved the right of the franchisor to compete with its franchisees under
different marks.151
The advent of the internet raises a number of new opportunities for
both franchisors and franchisees. The effects of this new way of reaching
customers in some segments of the retail and service industries, such as
travel services and accounting services, are yet to be fully understood. Two
recent arbitration decisions reemphasize how the language of the contract is
paramount in determining the respective rights and duties of franchisors and
franchisees. In Emporium Drug Mart Inc. v. Drug Emporium Inc. of
Denton, an arbitration panel decided that an online drug store was in fact an
actual drug store, and that its operations encroached on the exclusive
territories granted to franchisees in the franchise agreement. 52 Similarly,
an arbitration panel found that H&R Block franchisees were harmed by the
company's new internet tax preparation activities, and given their
contractual right to an exclusive territory, the franchisees may have claims
for damages against H&R Block.'
As in the case of traditional encroachment, many franchisors have
also instituted programs where internet sales are made through local
franchisee-owned shops or other mechanisms in which franchisees share in
the revenues or profits generated. 154 In fact, the arbitration panel in Drug
Emporium ordered the franchisor to direct customers to local stores instead
149 See Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F. Supp. 791, (D. Minn. 1989) and Rosenberg v.
Pillsbury Co., 718 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
150 Carlock, 719 F. Supp. at 802-03.
"' Clark, 110 F.3d at 297. For more on the issues raised by mergers or acquisitions in
the context of franchising, see, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS OF FRANCHISE COMPANIES (Leonard D. Vines ed.) (1996).
152 Emporium Drug Mart Inc. v. Drug Emporium Inc. of Denton, No. 71 114 00126 00
(Am. Arbitration Assoc., Dallas, Texas, Sept. 2, 2000).
153 PRESS RELEASE, GOLDSTEIN LAW GROUP, ARBITRATION PANEL FINDS THAT BLOCK
FRANCHISEES HARMED BY BLOCK'S INTERNET TAX PREPARATION ACTIVITIES MAY
HAVE CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES AGAINST BLOCK (January 15, 2003), available at
http://www.goldlawgroup.com/files/new-block-press-release- 1-1 5-03.pdf.
154 BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note t, at 233.
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of shipping directly to those respective customers living in franchisees'
exclusive territories.
155
Above all, whether for internet sales or for other channels, the
decisions above again point to the importance of explicit language covering
every alternative channel in franchise agreements so that both parties are
clear as to what is permitted and what is not.
4. Advertising and Promotion
As described in Section III, most franchisors today require that
franchisees contribute a proportion of their sales towards advertising
expenses. Interestingly, the reliance on separate advertising fees was not
always so popular. In 1980, the majority of franchisors charged neither
sales-based nor fixed advertising fees. 156  This change towards more
frequent usage of explicit advertising fees in franchise contracts today
seems to reflect in part, a form of contract evolution; whereas franchisors
used to specify royalties only and use some of the royalty revenues for
advertising purposes, the majority of them now explicitly separate the
royalty and the advertising requirements. James A. Brickley surmises that
the increased reliance on separate fees may be a response to a franchisor
moral hazard 157 problem in that franchisors may have an incentive to use
funds for unrelated purposes if they are not slated specifically for
advertising. 158 Indeed, as he points out, some franchise contracts specify
that moneys collected via the advertising fee cannot be commingled with
other funds.'59 Yet even such efforts to separate the funds may not resolve
franchisor opportunism problems. In their respective studies, Kabir C. Sen,
Robert Stassen and Robert Mittelstaedt, and Francine Lafontaine and
Kathryn L. Shaw all examine the relationship between advertising fees and
actual advertising expenditures. 160 These authors find only a weak positive
or no correlation between the two. Of course, advertising outlays need not
155 Before the order was even implemented, Drug Emporium sold its web site to
HealthCentral.com. Shortly thereafter, it underwent a bankruptcy restructuring and was
acquired by another drug store chain.
156 See Table 6, supra,
117 Moral hazard generally refers to situations where a more informed person takes
advantage of a less informed person by taking some unobserved action that is different
from what the uninformed party would have preferred. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. PERLOFF,
MICROECONOMICs 637 (4th ed. 2007). In the present case, the assumption is that the
franchisor has an informational advantage over its franchisees.
158 James A. Brickley, Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from
Franchising, 42 J.L. & ECON. 745 (1999). Brickley, however, mostly views these fees
as a constraint on franchisee behavior, which he argues and finds empirically are related
to the extent of sales externalities among outlets; that is, chains with more externality
problems (more non-repeat business) must impose such requirement more often.
159 Id. at 751, n.15.
'60 Sen, supra note 104; Stassen & Mittelstaedt, supra note 100; Francine Lafontaine &
Kathryn L. Shaw, Targeting Managerial Control: Evidence from Franchising, 36
RAND J. EcON. 131 (2005).
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be contemporaneous with the collection of fees. These studies have tried to
account for this factor by looking at advertising expenditures over long
periods, between five and ten years. Moreover, some of the funds may be
spent on regional or local advertising or promotional efforts not captured in
the data the authors rely upon. Finally, for many franchisors, especially
those with low or no fees, advertising outlays need not be limited by the
amount of fees collected specifically for this purpose. Thus, it is perhaps
not surprising that there is little correlation between estimated outlays and
percentage fees.
There is much variance in the way franchisors specify their
advertising requirement; how they divide it among national, regional, and
local expenditures; and what the franchisor exactly commits to. Some
franchisors establish an advertising fund while others do not. In its
franchise contract, Bruegger's Bagels, for example, requires that:
Franchisee shall contribute weekly to the advertising Fund
established by Franchisor for the System two percent (2%)
of the Gross Sales of the Franchised Bakery.
In addition to its contribution to the Fund, Franchisee shall
spend monthly for local advertising and promotion two
percent (2%) of the Gross Sales of the Franchised Bakery.
Franchisee acknowledges that the Fund and any earnings
thereon will be used to maximize general public
recognition, acceptance, and patronage of BRUEGGER'S
Bakeries, and that Franchisor is not obligated, in
administering the Fund, to make expenditures for
Franchisee which are equivalent or proportional to
Franchisee's contribution, or to ensure that any particular
franchisee benefits directly or pro rata from expenditures
by the Fund. Franchisee acknowledges that its failure to
derive any such benefit will not serve as a basis for a
reduction or elimination of its obligation to contribute to
the Fund. 1
61
This language makes it clear that the franchisee must pay 2% of
gross sales for national advertising and that it is up to the franchisor to
decide how best to expend these funds. By acknowledging the uncertain
benefits to be derived from this advertising, each franchisee agrees that he
may be paying more than the advertising is worth to them. Based on the
plain language of the contract, the franchisee surrenders any right to
161 Bruegger's Bagels New Bakery Franchise Agreement, as incorporated in its 2000
Disclosure Document cited by BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note t, at 251.
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complain about the quality or geographic allocation of the franchisor's
promotional efforts.
McDonald's, of course, also recognizes the value of advertising and
demands that its franchisees spend a significant sum on this activity.' 62 In
1990, the McDonald's franchise system spent approximately $80-90
million to produce television and radio commercials and $245 million to
purchase national media time-mostly on network television. 163 Advertising
on the national, as well as the local level, is organized by cooperatives. 164
Each franchisee member of the national cooperative must pledge the same
contribution rate (1.65% in 2003).165 Local cooperatives are formed by
restaurant owners in various geographic locations who join together and
decide on local promotions and advertising campaigns. In 1990, these
cooperatives spent approximately $190 million on advertising, most of
which was spent on local television time. 166  The franchise contract
stipulates that franchisees must spend at least 4% of their sales revenue in
total on advertising:
McDonald's employs both public relations and advertising
specialists who formulate and carry out national and local
advertising programs for the McDonald's System.
Franchisee shall use only advertising and promotional
materials and programs provided by McDonald's or
approved in advance, in writing, by McDonald's [... ]
Franchisee shall expend during each calendar year for
advertising and promotion of the Restaurant to the general
public an amount which is not less than four percent (4%)
of Gross Sales [ . . . ] for such year. Expenditures by
Franchisee to national and regional cooperative advertising
and promotion of the McDonald's System, or to a group of
McDonald's restaurants which includes the Restaurant,
shall be a credit against the required minimum expenditures
for advertising and promotion to the general public. 16
7
Thus, McDonald's controls the quality of the advertising and the
minimum amount that each franchisee must spend. Note, however, that
162 id.
163 Id.
164 McDonald's Uniform Franchise Offering Circular [hereinafter McDonald's
Circular], 2003, at 63.16 51 d. at 64.
166 See Testimony of David B. Green, McDonald's Senior Vice President for Marketing,
(June 5, 1993), available at
http://www.mcspotlight.org/people/witnesses/advertising/green.html (last visited Mar.
14, 2009).
167 McDonald's Circular, supra note 164, at 106.
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none of the advertising moneys are paid to McDonald's corporation.
Instead, the funds are administered directly by the advertising cooperatives
and are subsequently independently audited. The franchisee has the
freedom to participate in these cooperative advertising efforts with other
franchisees, but he or she cannot choose to expend less than the 4% stated
in his or her franchise agreement on advertising and promotion. In practice,
however, franchisees who want to be considered for additional units or even
contract renewal are expected to participate consistently in the national and
local cooperatives. Company-owned restaurants may also elect to be
members of these cooperatives.
A number of franchisors also establish programs that allow them to share
some of the cost that franchisees incur for local or regional advertising.
Specifically, according to Dant and Berger, almost 75% of franchisors in
the auto products and services industry, and 86% of the franchisors in the
fast-food industry, engage in some form of cooperative advertising program
with their franchisees. 1
68
Finally, franchisors leave themselves substantial leeway to make changes
over time in their contracts when it comes to advertising contributions. For
example, Stassen and Mittlestaedt report that in its 10-K report, Wendy's
states "the Company may increase the total advertising and promotions
contribution to 5% ... if such increase is approved by an affirmative vote
representing 75% or more of all domestic Wendy's restaurants."'' 69 Though
the contribution to the national advertising fund was 1.5% through 1999 at
Applebee's, the 10-K report for that year stated "the required contribution
to the national advertising fund will increase to 2.1% of gross sales in 2000,
and may increase from 2.1% to a maximum of 2.5% in 2001. Beginning in
2002, the required contribution will be 2.5% of gross sales."
' ' 70
Furthermore, "[t]he Company can increase the combined amount of the
advertising fee and the amount required to be spent on local advertising and
promotional activities to a maximum of 5% of gross sales."' 7' Of course,
raising the amount that franchisees must devote to advertising at any point
in time is likely to cause some conflict in a franchise system.
5. Contract Duration
In their survey of franchisors, IFA and the FRANdata Corp. found
that the average duration for franchise contracts is 10.3 years. 72 Table 9,
infra, shows the mean duration of the initial contract and its standard
deviation across sectors in the first and last year for which we have duration
168 Rajiv P. Dant &Paul D. Berger, Modeling Cooperative Advertising Decisions in
Franchising, 47 J. OPERATIONAL RES. SOC'Y 1120, 1122 (1996).
169 Stassen & Mittlestaedt, supra note 100, at 10.
17 Id. at 10.
171 Id.
172 PROFILE OF FRANCHISING 2000, supra note 77, at 116.
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information in our data, namely 1993 and 2001. This table shows that our
data exhibits a very similar duration on average to what was found in the
IFA sample, and that the mean duration of the contract has remained about
the same over time as well.
In addition, Table 9, infra, illustrates the substantial variation in the
duration of these contracts across sectors. For example, the average
contract length in the sit-down restaurant industry is 14-plus years, which is
twice as long as in the real estate sector. Moreover, contract length varies
more within some sectors than others, as indicated by the differences in the
standard deviation of contract duration across these sectors. Thus, different
franchisors offer contracts of substantially different lengths in the recreation
sector; the standard deviation of contract length in this industry is almost as
large as the mean contract duration. On the other hand, for franchisors in
the contractor and rental sectors, the standard deviation is only three or four
years around a mean duration of roughly nine years. The data also suggest
that there has not been any trend toward shorter or longer contracts on
average in franchising, within sectors or over time, except perhaps in the
Hotel and Motel sector. Finally, Table 9 includes information on the
number of firms in our data in each of the two years covered in the table,
and it documents the low frequency with which franchisors choose to rely
on an infinite or indefinite contract duration.
It is important to realize that these average durations hide some
interesting, discrete patterns in the data. Specifically, contract length
mostly varies in 5-year increments.'73 In 2001, 20% of the franchisors in
our data offered 5-year contracts, 53% used 10-year contracts, 7% offered
15-year contracts, and 14% percent relied on 20-year contracts. Thus, 94%
of all franchise contracts offered in 2001 fell within one of these four
durations. The corresponding total in 1993, and the proportions of
franchisors offering the different length contracts, are all very similar to
their 2001 counterparts.
Looking at this from the perspective of franchised outlets and
weighing the contract duration of each franchisor by the number of
franchised units they have, the discrete patterns remain. The 1158
franchisors in the data in 2001 operated a total of 329,803 franchised
units. 174 Of these units, 91% were under a 5, 10, 15, or 20-year contract.
The proportion of contracts for each duration, however, are quite different.
Specifically, the proportion of 20-year contracts is much higher-37%-
while the others are smaller: the proportions of 5, 10, and 15-year contracts
173 See James A. Brickley et al., Contract Duration: Evidence from Franchising, 49 J.L
& Econ. 173 (2006).
174 This total represents the number of franchised units of these chains that year, not
their total number of units. According to KOSTECKA, supra note 16, at 40, business
format franchised chains operated a total of 246,664 franchised units in 1986. Thus
while our data does not include all franchisors in 2001, it undoubtedly includes the vast
majority of franchised outlets.
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are 13, 37, and 4%, respectively. In other words, the data imply that larger
franchisors tend to offer 20-year contracts much more frequently than the
overall population of franchisors does, while franchisors with fewer
franchised outlets rely more on contracts of shorter duration. These same
patterns were found also in the 1993 data.
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TABLE 9: INITIAL FRANCHISE CONTRACT DURATION, PER SECTOR
1993 2001
Num Me Standa #infini Num Me Standa #infini
ber of an rd te, ber of an rd te,
Obs. Deviat indefin Obs. Deviat indefi
ion ite ion nite
Automot 12. 12.
ive 70 2 4.9 1 76 6 5.2 3
11. 11.
Business 132 0 6.7 6 118 0 6.4 4
Contract
ors 39 8.3 3.6 1 52 8.8 2.9 0
Cosmeti
c 27 9.9 3.8 1 22 9.5 3.2 1
Educatio
n 27 8.0 3.7 0 39 8.3 3.4 0
Fast 12. 12.
Food 212 1 4.6 3 229 3 4.9 2
Health &
Fitness 31 8.8 3.7 1 27 9.0 3.9 1
Home
Furnishin 10.
gs 24 0 6.4 0 25 9.1 3.9 0
Hotels & 12. 16.
Motels 22 9 6.2 0 19 7 5.2 0
Mainten
ance 76 9.4 5.2 0 98 9.7 4.7 3
Personal
Services 88 9.3 4.1 2 86 9.1 4.1 3
Real
Estate 22 7.9 4.0 1 35 7.1 2.7 0
Recreati 10. 10.
on 18 3 9.1 1 18 4 8.2 2
Rental 26 9.6 3.4 0 26 8.6 3.6 2
Restaura 14. 14.
nts 70 0 4.7 0 70 7 4.7 0
Retail
Food 40 8.9 2.4 3 42 9.6 3.9 1
Retail
Other 128 9.5 4.5 2 129 9.5 3.6 1
10. 10.
Total 1,052 6 22 1,111 7 23
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James A. Brickley, Sanjog Misra, and R. Lawrence Van Horn
analyze the factors that affect the duration of initial franchise contracts.
17 5
Consistent with our comparison of duration at the franchised unit level
versus franchisor level, these authors find that larger chains and franchisors
with more years of experience tend to use longer-term contracts. 176 And
although firms rarely change the duration of their contracts, the authors find
some tendency toward longer-term contracts over time within firms.
177
Finally, they show that contract duration is positively related to the amount
of physical and human investment (weeks of training) that franchisees must
make in the business.
178
6. Renewal and Termination
Franchise contracts usually stipulate an option to renew along with
the duration of the potential renewal period(s). 79  In their survey of
franchise contracting practices, IFA and the FRANdata Corp. found that
91% of franchise contracts included an option to renew, and that the
renewal period lasted for an average of 8.2 years.' 80
While most franchisors offer franchisees an opportunity to renew
their contracts, what matters to franchisees is the likelihood that their
contract will indeed be renewed. This probability not only affects the
profits they themselves can expect to earn from their franchise, it also
affects the resale value of their franchise. Although the USDOC does not
report renewal and termination rates in traditional franchising, it does show
that renewal was the norm at the time at least for business-format
franchising.' 8' Of the 12,999 agreements up for renewal in 1986, 12,073, or
93% were renewed. 82 Of the 926 that were not, 359 were cases where the
franchisee did not want a new contract; 374 were cases of mutual
agreement not to renew; and 193 were cases where franchisors refused to
renew. 18 3 Contract terminations are more common: 3075 agreements were
terminated by franchisors in 1986, while 3914 were terminated by
franchisees, and another 372 franchises were terminated by mutual
agreement. 8 4  According to the same source, these 7361 terminations
correspond to a 3% termination rate in 1986, given the 246,664 franchised
outlets in operation. The USDOC further documents that more than half of
the terminations instigated by franchisors were due to franchisee non-
175 Brickley et al., supra note 173.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 For a more complete overview of renewals and terminations and the conflict that
may result, see BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note t, at Chapter 10.
180 PROFILE OF FRANCHISING 2000, supra note 77, at 110, 116.
181 KOSTECKA, supra note 16, at 53.
182 id.
183 Id.
184 ld.
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payment of fees or financial default.'85 Moreover, franchisors approved all
but ninety-four of the 4202 requests for ownership transfers-bequests or
sales of the franchise to new owners-that they received from franchisees in
1986. 186
Darrel L. Williams used the Characteristics of Business Owners
("CBO") database compiled by the United States Census Bureau to study
termination rates. 187 He found 1001 franchise contracts with full-time
owner involvement and at least one employee in 1987 in these data.'88 In
this sample, he observed a termination rate of 15.7% over a 4-year period,
including terminations instigated by franchisees and franchisors. 89
Consistent with the figures from the USDOC on terminations and
ownership transfers, Williams further found that slightly more than 50% of
the franchise contract terminations in his data were motivated by the desire
of the franchisor or franchisee, to transfer ownership to another
franchisee.' 90 One-third of all contract terminations resulted in the outlet
being closed.1 91 Most importantly, the types of outlets that were most
subject to termination were the underperformers, suggesting that
franchisors use termination to enforce performance standards or eliminate
poor locations. 1
92
In sum, the data show that franchise contracts usually are quite long
term, with a very high tendency for the relationship to continue beyond the
original term. When they do not continue beyond that point, it is often at
the request of the franchisee that the relationship is terminated. Evidence
suggests further that contract termination by franchisors serves a
disciplining, or enforcement, role in these relationships, rather than being a
manifestation of opportunistic behavior on the part of the franchisors.
VI. CONCLUSION
Franchising is not an industry, but a form of business organization
used by a variety of firms involved in various types of retail and small-scale
service industries. This form of organization usually entails the use of
sales-based royalties and franchise fees, along with exclusive marks. But
beyond these similarities, we also find a great deal of variety in the
contracting practices of different franchisors. This is not surprising given
18 5 Id.
186 Id.
i87 Darrell L. Williams, Franchise Contract Termination: Is there Evidence of
Franchisor Abuse? in TENTH ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
OF FRANCHISING (Ann Dugan, ed.) (1996).
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
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the different business activities of franchised firms, and the specific
challenges that individual firms in these sectors face. Thus, our first goal in
this paper was to describe the variety of contracting practices across
franchising firms, and relate it, at least partly, to the different types of
business activities in which these firms were engaged.
Our second goal was to show how franchise contract terms also can
change over time. Individual franchisors regularly try new business and
contract practices, either because their business plan calls for a different
approach from those used to date, or because they simply thought of
something different they could try to do. At times, they also modify their
contracts in response to some external factors-including changes in
regulatory environment and new market opportunities-which affect how
they can or want to do business. On the regulatory front, for example, the
Chicken Delight decision, supra, led to a systematic increase in sales-based
royalties throughout franchising. We also have seen a trend towards
explicitly separating royalty rates and advertising fees over the last two
decades. Disputes over territorial rights in the quick-service restaurant
sector and in hotel chains have led many of the firms in these industries to
include much more detailed territory definitions in their contracts. They
have also led franchisors to develop more systematic review processes for
new sites and policies for allocating new units to owners of close-by
outlets, thereby resolving at least part of the conflict. In industries where
encroachment via alternative channels has been more problematic (e.g.,
sales through supermarkets or via the internet), some franchisors have
worked on ways to channel part of the sales or profits to the local franchisee
while others have opted to stay out of the alternative channels.
Experimentation is part and parcel of the evolution of any mode of
organization, and franchising is no exception. This is especially true
because franchising in reality is not just one form of organization, but rather
a whole spectrum of possibilities, from fairly simple licensed
distributorships to complete turn-key businesses where franchisees receive
detailed and regularly updated operations guidelines. Presumably, what
works well in each system is retained and refined; what does not work well
is discarded. Moreover, franchisors continuously face new challenges and
opportunities. 193 Those that best respond to these challenges and
opportunities remain successful, while many others stop franchising, fail to
grow, or go out of business altogether. In other words, franchising is a
varied and dynamic phenomenon. Unfortunately, this also makes it
193 One contracting issue that we did not address above and that could be of interest
relates to the use of resale price maintenance. It does not appear at this point that
franchisors have modified their contract much at all in response to the State Oil Co. v.
Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) decision. Now that the United States Supreme Court has also
returned minimum resale prices to the rule of reason in Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007), it will be interesting to see if this
will generate renewed interest in price controls in franchise contracts in the U.S.
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difficult to develop appropriate regulatory regimes to address franchisor-
franchisee conflict. Our hope is that a description of these relationships
will permit a better assessment of the likely cost and benefit of different
types of regulatory interventions across all the different types of industries
where franchising exists, or in the future, may be used.
